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GENETIC DUTIES
JESSICA L. ROBERTS* & ALEXANDRA L. FOULKES**
ABSTRACT
Most of our genetic information does not change, yet the results of
our genetic tests might. Labs reclassify genetic variants in response
to advances in genetic science. As a result, a person who took a test
in 2010 could take the same test with the same lab in 2020 and get
a different result. However, no legal duty requires labs or physicians
to inform patients when a lab reclassifies a variant, even if the re-
classification communicates clinically actionable information. This
Article considers the need for such duties and their potential chal-
lenges. In so doing, it offers much-needed guidance to physicians and
labs, who may face liability, and to courts, which will hear these
cases.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine this scenario. A thirty-seven-year-old woman arrives at
a medical center with stage 4 breast cancer. Despite a family
medical history of breast and ovarian cancers, she was not getting
additional cancer screenings. Why? Because the patient took a
genetic test in 2010, and the results did not indicate an increased
risk for BRCA1/BRCA2 hereditary breast/ovarian cancer.1 The
patient, therefore, took no special precautions.
Following the breast cancer diagnosis in 2020, the patient sees a
clinical geneticist. The clinical geneticist looks at the patient’s
pedigree and is puzzled. “This looks like a BRCA1/BRCA2 family,”
she thinks, and decides to order another genetic test. The second
time, the patient’s BRCA1 test comes back positive for a heightened
cancer risk. However, because the patient already has breast cancer,
this newfound knowledge is of little help to her personally,2 and she
later dies. So what happened? And, more importantly, was her
death preventable?
At first blush, it may seem incomprehensible that a patient could
take a test for a BRCA1 mutation in 2010 and again in 2020 and get
such different results. After all, our genetics do not generally
change.3 Much of our genome is determined before birth and—apart
from the occasional random mutation here and there—largely stays
1. Some common forms of breast cancer have a large hereditary component. Although
several genes play a part in their development, most heredity cases can be attributed to
mutations in the BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes. T. R. Rebbeck, F.J. Couch, J. Kant, K. Calzone, M.
DeShano, Y. Peng, K. Chen, J.E. Garber & B.L. Weber, Genetic Heterogeneity in Hereditary
Breast Cancer: Role of BRCA1 and BRCA2, 59 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 547, 547 (1996). In fact,
5-10 percent of breast cancers are inherited, and of those, about 50 percent are attributed to
BRCA1. Id.; BARBARA T. ZIMMERMAN, UNDERSTANDING BREAST CANCER GENETICS 46 (2004).
BRCA1 is a large gene, with about one hundred thousand base pairs. ZIMMERMAN, supra, at
45. And there are about five hundred known mutations of the normal BRCA1 allele. Id. at 46.
Although carriers of certain BRCA1 mutations have a higher chance of developing the disease,
it is not well understood why some people with a specific mutation develop the condition early
in life, while others never go on to develop breast cancer at all. See id.
2. That said, her family members could still benefit, particularly first-degree family
members who will have a 50 percent risk of being carriers.
3. Orhan Soykan, Biological Sensors for Diagnostics, in MEDICAL DEVICES AND HUMAN
ENGINEERING 8-1 (Joseph D. Bronzino & Donald R. Peterson eds., 2015).
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the same throughout our lives.4 How, then, can we explain our
patient’s experience? Did the original lab botch the test? Did the
doctor give her another patient’s results in 2010? Was she the vic-
tim of a rare environmental exposure that radically altered her
DNA? The answer to all of these questions is no. The lab performed
the test properly, the ordering physician gave her the right test
results the first time, and her genetic sequence remained the same.
Our understanding of genetics simply changed.
When scientists completed a rough draft of the human genome in
2000, it was only the beginning.5 Although we had the genetic code,
we did not—and indeed may never—fully appreciate its meaning.
Researchers are constantly uncovering new genetic links and
deepening our knowledge of how genetic variations impact our
health.6 Scientists make claims of new genetic discoveries, a new
genetic link, or a newly discovered genetic function almost daily.7
Because so much of our genome is still a mystery, we may not
fully understand the medical impact of a particular genetic varia-
tion.8 We call those variations “variants of uncertain (or unknown)
significance,” or VUSs.9 A VUS result reveals that the patient’s
4. Id. There are, however, exceptions to the general rule. Under certain circumstances
our DNA and its functions do, in fact, change. See A. Bird, Perceptions of Epigenetics, 447
NATURE 396, 397-98 (2007). Epigenetic changes, or changes in gene function that cannot be
explained by changes in DNA sequence, are sometimes heritable. Id. Random mutations in
our DNA happen all of the time. See Changes in Genes, AM. CANCER SOC’Y (June 25, 2014),
https://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancer-causes/genetics/genes-and-cancer/gene-changes.html
[https://perma.cc/ZSG3-2AMA]. Occasionally, these changes may lead to a person developing
cancer. Id. Exposure to radiation is also known to induce structural changes and chemical
modifications in DNA. See, e.g., Lin Ou, Yang Chen, Ying Su, Changyan Zou & Zhong Chen,
Detection of Genomic DNA Damage from Radiated Nasopharyngeal Carcinoma Cells Using
Surface-Enhanced Raman Spectroscopy (SERS), 70 APPLIED SPECTROSCOPY 1821, 1822 (2016).
5. JANEY LEVY, THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 28-29 (2018). 
6. ALAN PETERSEN & ROBIN BUNTON, THE NEW GENETICS AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 113
(2002).
7. Id. at 113, 115-16 (“Rarely a day goes by without the announcement of some new gene
discovery or of a likely new genetic-based treatment or prevention strategy.... [I]t should be
of no surprise that a significant number of each of the newspapers report the discovery of a
new gene, a gene link, a gene mutation.”).
8. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., GENES, BEHAVIOR, & THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT
3 (Lyla M. Hernandez & Dan G. Blazer eds., 2006).
9. See generally Sue Richards, Nazneen Aziz, Sherri Bale, David Bick, Soma Das, Julie
Gastier-Foster, Wayne W. Grody, Madhuri Hedge, Elaine Lyon, Elaine Spector, Karl
Voelkerding & Heidi L. Rehm, Standards and Guidelines for the Interpretation of Sequence
Variants: A Joint Consensus Recommendation of the American College of Medical Genetics and
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genes differ from the majority of the population.10 However, at the
time of the testing, the science is not yet clear whether that
difference is good, bad, or neutral.11 Sometimes a genetic variation
that we did not fully understand will take on new meaning. When
a VUS gains clinical significance, it is no longer a VUS.12 Based on
this new knowledge, scientists can reclassify the variant from a
VUS to benign, likely benign, likely pathogenic, or pathogenic.13 A
lab may then interpret the same genetic sequence differently de-
pending on the scientific knowledge at the time of the testing.14
Such a scenario is what happened to our hypothetical patient.
Around the time of her first genetic test in 2010, most research on
BRCA1 genes had been done on women of predominantly European
descent.15 The science then was fairly good at detecting dangerous
genetic variants in that population.16 We did not, however, know as
much about the genetics of breast cancer in people with non-
European ancestry.17 Imagine that our patient had genetic ancestors
in sub-Saharan Africa. As a result, her BRCA1 variation came back
Genomics and the Association for Molecular Pathology, 17 GENETICS MED. 405 (2015).
10. Noralane M. Lindor, David E. Goldgar, Sean V. Tavtigian, Sharon E. Plo & Fergus J.
Couch, BRCA1/2 Sequence Variants of Uncertain Significance: A Primer for Providers to Assist
in Discussions and in Medical Management, 18 ONCOLOGIST 518, 518 (2013).
11. See Daniele Carrieri, Heidi C. Howard, Caroline Benjamin, Angus J. Clarke, Sandi
Dheensa, Shane Doheny, Naomi Hawkins, Tanya F. Halbersma-Konings, Leigh Jackson,
Hülya Kayserili, Susan E. Kelly, Anneke M. Lucassen, Álvaro Mendes, Emmanuelle Rial-
Sebbag, Vigdís Stefánsdóttir, Peter D. Turnpenny, Carla G. van El, Irene M. van Langen,
Martina C. Cornel & Francesca Forzano, Recontacting Patients in Clinical Genetics Services:
Recommendations of the European Society of Human Genetics, 27 EUR.J.HUM.GENETICS 169,
170 (2018). 
12. See, e.g., Lindor et al., supra note 10, at 523.
13. See, e.g., id. at 521.
14. See Sarah Macklin, Nisha Durand, Paldeep Atwal & Stephanie Hines, Observed
Frequency and Challenges of Variant Reclassification in a Hereditary Cancer Clinic, 20
GENETICS MED. 346, 348-49 (2018).
15. Tuya Pal, Jenny Permuth-Wey, Tricia Holtje & Rebecca Sutphen, BRCA1 and BRCA2
Mutations in a Study of African American Breast Cancer Patients, 13 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY,
BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 1794, 1794 (2004) (“[M]ost studies of BRCA1 ... have been done
in Caucasian families.... The spectrum of mutations in the African American population is
slowly beginning to be characterized.”).
16. See id.
17. See Sudeshna Chatterjee, E. Chapman-Davis, J.C. Fields, S. Chatterjee-Paer, K.J.
Sapra, Z.N. Zhou, B. Jordan, M.K. Frey, D. Nasioudis & K.M. Holcomb, Does Race Play a Role
in Genetic Screening for Hereditary Cancer Syndromes?, 35 J.CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1578, 1578
(2017) (“Non-white patients had higher rates of VUS, emphasizing the need for improved VUS
reclassification in non-[w]hite populations.”).
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as a VUS. Because the variant lacked known clinical significance,
her doctor did not report the result as pathogenic. In the ensuing
years, scientists began to study breast cancer in a wider range of
patients. That research led the lab to reclassify the patient’s genetic
variant as likely pathogenic and, ultimately, as pathogenic in
2015.18 When she took her second genetic test in 2020, her result
was positive for a pathogenic variant. Had she known of this risk
sooner, perhaps the patient could have caught the cancer at an
earlier stage or even have had a prophylactic mastectomy, maybe
saving her life.
At present, genetic testing laboratories and physicians have no
recognized legal duties to take any action when a VUS gains clinical
significance.19 This Article considers the need for those genetic
duties. Failing to inform patients of variant reclassifications can
have life-or-death consequences. While we appreciate the gravity of
this topic for patients, we also recognize the potential costs of these
duties and the looming uncertainties regarding how the science and
technology will develop.
Our proposal for imposing genetic duties has three parts: (1) pro-
active measures, (2) a legal duty to reinterpret, and (3) a legal duty
to recontact. First, we encourage laboratories and physicians to act
proactively by educating patients about the possibility of variant
reclassification at the outset and by outlining the steps that the
laboratories and physicians will (or perhaps will not) take to share
the updated results. However, when that is not possible, we suggest
that courts split the legal duties related to variant reclassification.
Drawing from the concept of the cheapest cost avoider, we argue
that labs are in the best position to reinterpret genetic test results,
whereas ordering physicians are in the best position to recontact
patients. Our liability framework would, therefore, impose the duty
18. This hypothetical is based on an actual reclassification of the BRCA1 gene. See
Database of BRCA1 and BRCA2 Sequence Variants That Have Been Clinically Reclassified
Using a Quantitative Integrated Evaluation, LEIDEN OPEN VARIATION DATABASE (Aug. 28,
2019), http://hci-exlovd.hci.utah.edu/home.php?select_db=BRCA1 [https:perma.cc/WKJ6-
TYD4].
19. See, e.g., Yvonne A. Stevens, Grant D. Senner & Gary E. Marchant, Physicians’ Duty
to Recontact and Update Genetic Advice, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NAT’L LIBR. OF MED.:
PUBMED CENT. (June 8, 2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5693364/
[https://perma.cc/K25S-3CRU].
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to reinterpret on the lab and the duty to recontact on the physician.
Given the potential impact that legal liability could have on genetic
testing and clinical care, we encourage courts to proceed with
caution and to make these liability determinations on a case-by-case
basis. Thus, while we advocate recognizing these duties, what
constitutes a breach may vary significantly depending on the indi-
vidual circumstances.
This Article is novel in at least two ways. One, it is among the
first in the legal literature to address the need for potential legal
duties related to variant reclassification.20 Two, it proposes a
solution to the cutting-edge question of how to fairly impose those
potential duties. As such, it provides an important contribution to
the conversation surrounding variant reclassification and can serve
as a valuable resource for lawyers, medical professionals, judges,
and scholars alike.
We discuss the legal implications of variant reclassification in
three Parts. Part I gives the relevant scientific background and
explores the existing tort doctrines likely to apply to variant
reclassification. In Part II, we consider the arguments in favor of
genetic duties related to variant reclassification, noting that labora-
tories are best situated to bear the costs of reinterpretation, while
ordering physicians are best situated to bear the costs of recontact-
ing patients. Part III proposes our framework for providing patients
with access to updated test results. We begin by urging laboratories
and physicians to take action now by developing policies to educate
patients and to inform them of variant reclassifications. In older
cases, when these proactive processes would not apply, we argue for
bifurcating the duties associated with variant reclassification into
(1) a duty to reinterpret and (2) a duty to recontact, and imposing
those duties on their respective cheapest cost avoiders. We then
analyze what would constitute a breach of these novel legal duties
using a variety of case studies. We conclude that whether a
defendant violated a genetic duty will depend heavily on the facts
of the individual case.
20. See, e.g., Alexandra L. Foulkes, Jessica L. Roberts, Paul S. Appelbaum, Wendy K.
Chung, Ellen Wright Clayton, Barbara Evans & Gary E. Marchant, Can Clinical Genetics
Laboratories Be Sued for Medical Malpractice?, 29 ANNALS HEALTH L. & LIFE SCIS. 153, 153-
55 (2020).
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I. SCIENCE AND LAW OF VARIANT RECLASSIFICATION
Most of a person’s genetic information is fixed before birth.21 Yet,
genetic test results—and the diagnoses of genetic conditions—can
change over time, even while the content of the underlying genetic
code remains exactly the same.22 This somewhat counterintuitive
reality is what lies at the heart of variant reclassification. This Part
provides an overview of the science behind VUSs and explores the
bodies of law that would apply to potential legal disputes relating to
reclassifying variants.
A. Scientific Background
Here, we provide a brief explanation of exactly what VUSs are
and how laboratories decide whether to reclassify them. We then
turn to the harms that could occur when patients lack access to
their updated results following a reclassification.
1. Reclassification
We can start with a review of high school biology. Our bodies are
made up of cells.23 The nuclei of our cells hold most of our DNA in
the form of chromosomes.24 Humans have twenty-three pairs of
chromosomes, forty-six total, and those chromosomes contain our
genes.25 We have about twenty-four thousand genes.26
Technically speaking, genes are molecules of deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) that store genetic information as a series of base pairs.27
Only four letters exist in the genetic “alphabet”: adenine (A),
cytosine (C), guanine (G), and thymine (T).28 While most humans
have largely the same set of genes—in fact we are all 99.9 percent
21. See Soykan, supra note 3, at 8-9.
22. See id.
23. See DAVID P. CLARK & NANETTE J. PAZDERNIK, MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 4 (2d ed. 2013).
24. Id. at 116.
25. Id. at 25.
26. MARK STONEKING, AN INTRODUCTION TO MOLECULAR ANTHROPOLOGY 21 (2017).
27. See generally CLARK & PAZDERNIK, supra note 23, at 71-74.
28. Id. at 66.
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genetically similar29—the individual “spellings” of our genes may
vary.30 For example, all humans have two copies of the BRCA1 gene,
one from each parent.31 That gene codes for a protein that acts as a
tumor suppressor.32 However, some people have a version of the
BRCA1 gene that makes them more susceptible to breast and
ovarian cancer.33 We call the different versions of these genes
“variants.”34 While we all have a BRCA1 gene, certain variants of
that gene correlate with an increased cancer risk.35
Geneticists can use the variations in genetic spelling to give
patients information about their health.36 Genetic research has
generated something that can be thought of as a genetic reference
text.37 When a person gets a genetic test, we compare the individ-
ual’s version of the gene to the versions of the gene contained in the
reference text.38
The methods that labs use to analyze genetic variants, as well as
the different kinds of genetic testing services that they offer, will
affect labs’ legal obligations to their patients. A BRCA1 test
identifies which version of the BRCA1 gene the patient has and
cross-references that information with the knowledge of cancer risk
29. GARY KEENEY, SHOOTING LADDERS: VARIOUS THOUGHTS, BELIEFS, STORIES, AND
ADVICE FOR TORI 657 (2010) (“Everyone on this planet shares approximately 99.9% of our
genes with everyone else.”).
30. Alexandra Keller, David Smith, Brenda Harrop, Louis Lamit, Melanie Schroer, Adam
Wymore & Catherine Ueckert, Genes Are Us: Analyzing DNA Differences Using DNA
Fingerprinting, 36 SCI. SCOPE 52, 53 (2012).
31. Recall that human beings have forty-six chromosomes, made up of twenty-three pairs.
We therefore each have two copies of all of our autosomal genes. These copies are called
alleles. See Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 99. The result is that we each have two versions of
any given gene. A person then has two copies of the BRCA1 gene, two copies of the BRCA2
gene, two copies of the SCN1A gene, etc. See id. at 45.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 45-47. 
36. See id. (describing gene mutations that indicate an increased risk of certain cancers).
37. James C. Wilson, Disability and the Human Genome, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES
READER 52, 52 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 3d ed. 2010).
38. See How Does Genetic Testing Work?, IOWA INST. OF HUM. GENETICS, https://
medicine.uiowa.edu/humangenetics/clinical-genetics/patients-and-families/how-does-genetic-
testing-work [https://perma.cc/88HG-9KBX] (describing genetic testing as a search for gene
variations from the norm).
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associated with the known BRCA1 variants.39 That is an example of
a “single-gene” test.40
Labs may also run “gene panels” rather than single-gene tests. A
panel of genes might involve several individual genes, perhaps for
a single type of condition.41 Tests known as “virtual panels” can
generate a significant amount of genetic data.42 When labs run
virtual panels, they sequence—and perhaps analyze—more genes
than they actually report back to the ordering physician.43 Imagine
a doctor orders a lab to run a gene panel on fifty of a patient’s genes.
Depending on the available technology, the lab may streamline its
workflow by generating data on five hundred different genes that it
regularly encounters. However, the lab will only analyze and report
the results on the fifty genes requested. In fact, some labs may
generate data on all of the patient’s genes before analyzing and
reporting the relevant, requested genetic information.44 Depending
on their practices, laboratories may thus house troves of patient
data unrelated to the genetic tests ordered by the patients’ treating
physicians.
Moreover, when traditional genetic testing is either inappropri-
ate or inconclusive, physicians may order full exome or full genome
sequencing.45 Full genome sequencing determines a person’s entire
genetic makeup at a given point in time.46 Full exome sequencing
provides a more affordable alternative to full genome sequencing by
examining only a person’s protein-coding genes.47 Because both
39. See Heather Fecteau, Kristen J. Vogel, Kristen Hanson & Shannon Morrill-Cornelius,
The Evolution of Cancer Risk Assessment in the Era of Next Generation Sequencing, 23 J.
GENETIC COUNSELING 633, 634 (2014).
40. See id.
41. Sami S. Amr & Birgit Funke, Targeted Hybrid Capture for Inherited Disease Panels,
in CLINICAL GENOMICS 251, 262 (Shashikant Kulkarni & John Pfeifer eds., 2015).
42. See Andrew J. Wallace, New Challenges for BRCA Testing: A View from the Diagnostic
Laboratory, 24 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS S10, S12 (2016); see also Leslie G. Biesecker,
Secondary Findings in Exome Slices, Virtual Panels, and Anticipatory Sequencing, 21
GENETICS MED. 41, 41 (2019).
43. Amr & Funke, supra note 41, at 262.
44. See Alex Nord, Stephen J. Salipante & Colin Pritchard, Copy Number Variant
Detection Using Next-Generation Sequencing, in CLINICAL GENOMICS, supra note 41, at 165,
172-73.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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kinds of genomic sequencing look at many more genes than single-
gene or panel tests, they can offer greater insights about the
potential causes of a health condition.
After generating the patients’ data—whether in the form of a
single-gene test, a gene panel, or a full sequence—the labs will then
analyze the results. As mentioned in the Introduction, laboratories
conducting genetic tests may label variants across a spectrum as
benign, likely benign, uncertain, likely pathogenic, or pathogenic.48
Sometimes a genetic test will reveal that a patient has a version
of a gene without a known risk profile. That version is what we call
a variant of uncertain significance, or VUS.49 In such cases, the
patient does not receive clinically actionable genetic information.50
Clinically actionable information allows the patient to make deci-
sions that could prevent the onset or the progression of a disease.51
For example, if a genetic test finds a pathogenic BRCA1 variant, the
patient could undergo prophylactic surgeries or agree to more
frequent screenings. These decisions could then lead to either
prevention or early detection. However, a VUS does not tell the
patient whether she is at greater, comparable, or lesser risk than
the rest of the population.52 The results simply tell the patient that
her variant differs from the majority of people in the database.
However, the results say nothing about what that difference actu-
ally means for the patient’s health.
Further complicating matters, different labs may classify the
same variant differently.53 Labs use their own internal protocols and
48. See generally Richards et al., supra note 9. These categories come from the ACMG
guidelines that most labs use to classify variants. Id. at 405-06. Today, some labs use the
ACMG guidelines to classify variants. See Cristi Radford & Michele Gabree, Variants of
Uncertain Significance—Frequently Asked Questions, THE ONCOLOGY NURSE, http://www.the
oncologynurse.com/ton-issue-archive/2018/july-2018-vol-11-no-3/17516-variants-of-uncertain-
significance [https://perma.cc/NK5E-5PPU].
49. See, e.g., Lindor et al., supra note 10, at 522.
50. See id. at 523.
51. See Gabriel Lázaro-Muñoz, John M. Conley, Arlene M. Davis, Anya E.R. Prince & R.
Jean Cadigan, Which Results to Return: Subjective Judgments in Selecting Medically
Actionable Genes, 21 GENETIC TESTING & MOLECULAR BIOMARKERS 184, 184 (2017) (defining
“medically actionable genes” as “those genes that may contain pathogenic variants associated
with a poor health outcome that can be mitigated by an available intervention”). 
52. See Lindor et al., supra note 10, at 523.
53. Steven M. Harrison, Jill S. Dolinsky, Amy E. Knight Johnson, Tina Pesaran, Danielle
R. Azzariti, Sherri Bale, Elizabeth C. Chao, Soma Das, Lisa Vincent & Heidi Rehm, Clinical
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have different sets of genetic reference data.54 For example, one lab
might weigh a certain piece of evidence suggesting a variant is
pathogenic more heavily than another lab.55 Consequently, the first
lab might report the variant as “likely pathogenic,” whereas
another lab might report the exact same variant as “uncertain.”56
Thankfully, over time these discrepancies tend to remedy them-
selves, and laboratories eventually reach a consensus about how to
interpret a given variant, allowing their classifications to converge.57
As our understanding of the genome deepens, we gain additional
knowledge about the clinical significance of VUSs and can reclassify
them. While reclassification is relatively rare currently,58 the num-
ber of reclassified VUSs will likely rise as more patients have
increasingly comprehensive genetic tests.59
Laboratories Collaborate to Resolve Differences in Variant Interpretations Submitted to
ClinVar, 19 GENETICS MED. 1096, 1096 (2017).
54. Id. at 1097.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1096 (describing examples of “inconsistencies in variant interpretations” in-
cluding “53% discordance of uncertain significance interpretations from one clinical laboratory
compared to another”).
57. See Laura M. Amendola, Gail P. Jarvik, Michael C. Leo, Heather M. McLaughlin,
Yassmine Akkari, Michelle D. Amaral, Jonathan S. Berg, Sawona Biswas, Kevin M. Bowling,
Laura K. Conlin, Greg M. Cooper, Michael O. Dorschner, Matther C. Dulik, Arezou A.
Ghazani, Rajarshi Ghosh, Robert C. Green, Ragan Hart, Carrie Horton, Jennifer J. Johnston,
Matthew S. Lebo, Aleksandar Milosavljevic, Jeffrey Ou, Chrstine M. Pak, Ronak Y. Patel,
Sumit Punj, Carolyn Sue Richards, Joseph Salama, Natasha T. Strande, Yaping Yang, Sharon
E. Plon, Leslie G. Biesecker & Heidi L. Rehm, Performance of ACMG-AMP Variant-
Interpretation Guidelines Among Nine Laboratories in the Clinical Sequencing Exploratory
Research Consortium, 98 AM.J.HUM.GENETICS 1067, 1071 (2016); Joshua L. Deignan, Wendy
K. Chung, Hutton M. Kearney, Kristin G. Monaghan, Catherine W. Rehder & Elizabeth C.
Chao, Points to Consider in the Reevaluation and Reanalysis of Genomic Test Results: A
Statement of the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics (ACMG), 21 GENETICS
MED. 1267, 1269 (2019); see also Heidi L. Rehm, A New Era in the Interpretation of Human
Genomic Variation, 19 GENETICS MED. 1092, 1092 (2017).
58. See Thomas P. Slavin, Lily R. Van Tongeren, Carolyn E. Behrendt, Ilana Solomon,
Christina Rybak, Bita Nehoray, Lili Kuzmich, Mariana Niell-Swiller, Kathleen R. Blazer, Shu
Tao, Kai Yang, Julie O. Culver, Sharon Sand, Danielle Castillo, Josef Herzog, Stacy W. Gray
& Jeffrey N. Weitzel, Prospective Study of Cancer Genetic Variants: Variation in Rate of
Reclassification by Ancestry, 110 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1059, 1059-60 (2018).
59. See Jacqueline Mersch, Nichole Brown, Sara Pirzadeh-Miller, Erin Mundt, Hannah
C. Cox, Krystal Brown, Melissa Ashton, Lisa Esterling, Susan Manley & Theodora Ross,
Prevalence of Variant Reclassification Following Hereditary Cancer Genetic Testing, 320
JAMA 1266, 1273 (2018).
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In deciding whether to reclassify a variant, labs may consider
several factors, including new guidelines, new reference databases,
new functional data about the variants, new methods to predict
pathogenicity, and newly identified mutations.60 Not surprisingly,
given the amount of information that it requires, the reclassification
process takes time. Studies have reported a lag of up to ten years.61
Some genetics labs employ a proactive variant reclassification
process by conducting periodic reviews of the variants in their
databases.62 A 2019 American College of Medical Genetics (ACMG)
policy document recommends that laboratories focus on reclassi-
fications with potential clinical implications because periodically
reevaluating variants is time-consuming, expensive, and under-
compensated.63 For instance, a lab might reevaluate the clinical
significance of variants classified as benign or likely benign less
often than variants classified as uncertain.64 However, at present,
no governing body formally dictates when it is appropriate to
60. See, e.g., id. at 1267; Jacqueline Mersch, Nichole Brown, Sara Pirzadeh-Miller, Erin
Mundt, Hannah C. Cox, Krystal Brown, Melissa Ashton, Lisa Esterling, Susan Manley &
Theodora Ross, Prevalence of Variant Reclassification Following Heredity Cancer Genetic
Testing: Supplementary Online Content, eMethods, Figure 1, https://cdn.jamanetwork.com/
ama/content_public/ journal/ jama/937531/joi180097supp1_prod.pdf?Expires=
2147483647&Signature=FqHIkhYauJIVhRx-y7Ge7l-8s83rV41N9jKIlveArv
WKO5nfOY6Z8ynlm3yrL7A2YRoaTT1FiDIKqCGf1JQJZdXzSDTzwMxg9YeuMaTLvCHI
WnBfP9wupPpSu27uvaC9xGS41yrCs-~onaOmcDgxc5sktwjLVIiVmJLTLxK-Wh8K-iU
daNupassM~ck53v8RRCBYDkm9Y-TWFRgBebu2YGjaiLyTLi9yTO6bJKCHlUaSe
J6LcjhXbLrcc2LCP2EUfFtZ662-4UXfVfhnHkEGBCsAv8Wqq79TVezIiFHO2DN1icoR-
T47~2oZ60GeOAjneZRrejlmew4TXSIe3WnQYQ__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAIE5G5
CRDK6RD3PGA [https://perma.cc/XR9E-H6LP] [hereinafter Mersch et al., Supplementary
Online Content] (describing Myriad Genetics’ variant reclassification and reclassification
system); Variant Classification and Reanalysis in Exome Testing, JACKSON LAB’Y,
https://www.jax.org/education-and-learning/clinical-and-continuing-education/genetic-
testing/variant-classification-and-reanalysis-in-exome-testing [https://perma.cc/56K5-7DGR]
(describing Jackson Laboratory’s reclassification methods); see also Slavin et al., supra note
58, at 1059-60 (“Despite the fact that variant reclassification may have profound implications
for patient care and medical decision-making, little is known about the factors associated with
variant reclassification.”).
61. See Mersch et al., Supplementary Online Content, supra note 60, eFigure 2 (reporting
a lag time of up to ten years); see also Slavin et al., supra note 58, at 1059-60.
62. See Thomas P. Slavin, Sophia Manjarrez, Colin C. Pritchard, Stacy Gray & Jeffrey N.
Weitzel, The Effects of Genomic Germline Variant Reclassification on Clinical Cancer Care,
10 ONCOTARGET 417, 419 (2019).
63. See Deignan et al., supra note 57, at 1268-69.
64. Id. at 1269.
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consider reclassifying a particular variant.65 And once a lab re-
classifies a variant, there is no standard operating procedure to
update patients.66
 With these realities in mind, let us return to our original hypo-
thetical.67 At the time of the testing in 2010, the BRCA1 mutation
that our patient carried was a VUS.68 Sometime after reporting her
results, the laboratory encountered reliable scientific evidence
indicating that our patient’s BRCA1 variant was in fact deleterious.
The lab technicians reanalyzed their available data, factoring in
their patients’ clinical histories.69 Based on these and other
considerations, the lab then reclassified the patient’s variant as
pathogenic in 2015.70 Had our patient gone to a different lab, that
lab might have reclassified her variant faster. But another lab could
have taken longer or not reclassified the variant at all. And even if
a different lab had reclassified the variant more quickly, nothing
guarantees that it would have notified the patient of the reclassifi-
cation. Due in part to its newness, variant reclassification is cur-
rently ad hoc and relatively unregulated.
65. The ACMG notes that “there is currently no consensus for when and how often
laboratories should review the classification of a particular variant.” Karen L. David, Robert
G. Best, Leslie Manace Brenman, Lynn Bush, Joshua L. Deignan, David Flannery, Jodi D.
Hoffman, Ingrid Holm, David T. Miller, James O’Leary & Reed E. Pyeritz, Patient Re-Contact
After Revision of Genomic Test Results: Points to Consider—A Statement of the American
College of Medical Genetics and Genomics (ACMG), 21 GENETICS MED. 769, 770 (2019); see
also KELLY EAST, WENDY CHUNG, KATE FOREMAN, MARI GILMORE, MICHELE GORNICK, LUCIA
HINDORFF,TIA KAUFFMAN,DONNA MESSERSMITH,CINDY PROWS,ELENA STOFFEL,JOON-HOYU
& SHARON PLON, CLINICAL SEQUENCING EXPLORATORY RESEARCH CONSORTIUM, GUIDE TO
INTERPRETING GENOMIC REPORTS: A GENOMICS TOOLKIT 4 (2019), https://www.genome.gov/
sites/default/files/media/files/2020-04/Guide_to_Interpreting_Genomic_Reports_Toolkit.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TU6S-NUTF]; Moriah Wright, Vijay Menon, Lindsay Taylor,
Maniamparampil Shashidharan, Twilla Westercamp & Charles Ternent, Factors Predicting
Reclassification of Variants of Unknown Significance, 216 AM. J. SURGERY 1148, 1157 (2018).
66. Stevens et al., supra note 19, at 1096.
67. See supra Introduction.
68. See supra Introduction.
69. These are the reasons Myriad Genetics cited for reclassifying BRCA1
c.5453A>G(p.Asp1818Gly) from a VUS to pathogenic. See Mersch et al., Supplementary
Online Content, supra note 60, eTable 8.
70. See supra Introduction.
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2. Harms
Before discussing the potential harms associated with failing to
notify patients of variant reclassifications, it is useful to take a step
back and consider the role of genetic science in the practice of
medicine. Genetics can have an immensely beneficial impact on
clinical care. Individuals typically take medical genetic tests for at
least one of four reasons: (1) to diagnose health conditions and to
identify treatment options;71 (2) to predict health risks;72 (3) to make
educated decisions about reproduction;73 and (4) to identify which
medications are likely to be effective or to have fewer adverse
effects.74 Put simply, people take genetic tests because they want
health-related information. However, if no one updates patients
when that information changes, patients cannot take the appropri-
ate action for their health.
Based on the reasons that people take genetic tests, patients
could experience three classes of potential harms related to variant
reclassification. First, VUSs themselves can be unsettling.75
Patients with VUSs may not fully understand their results, leading
to anxiety and distrust. Failing to inform a patient of a reclassifica-
tion can needlessly prolong those negative feelings. Second, the
unease associated with a VUS could lead a patient to take unneces-
sary medical action in response to a perceived threat.76 Informing
patients that a VUS is in fact benign could avoid that negative
result. Finally, if a lab reclassifies a VUS as pathogenic and fails to
share that information, patients could lose the opportunity to take
potentially life-saving clinical action.77 We consider each type of
harm in turn.
Although labs may not always report VUSs to patients, when they
do, it could create distress. Ambiguous results can frequently lead
71. R.O. Mason & G.E. Tomlinson, Genetic Research, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE ETHICS OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 165, 179 (Ruth Chadwick ed., 2001).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Allen D. Roses, Pharmacogenetics and the Practice of Medicine, 405 NATURE 857, 857
(2000).
75. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 90-104 and accompanying text.
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to feelings of insecurity, frustration, and helplessness.78 A study on
the experiences of patients who received VUS results revealed that
patients often express confusion about the uncertain results and
dismay about the lack of answers.79 Sometimes the VUS report even
led to patients feeling distrust toward their providers. One patient
was left so dissatisfied by her clinical experience that she described
it as “dreadful.”80 Others said the physician communicating the VUS
information “really didn’t seem to know what to do with the results”
or that their doctor “[had] totally dropped the ball.”81 The reclassifi-
cation of variants likewise can be unsettling if the patient does not
find out about the reclassification until much later. The delay could
further exacerbate these feelings of ambiguity and lead to a lack of
trust in the medical establishment.82
Beyond simply feeling stress from uncertain results, frightened
patients may decide to take medical action based on a VUS, such as
prophylactic surgery, only to discover later that their variant is
benign.83 For example, between 2016 and 2017, seven family
members made the difficult choice to undergo prophylactic surgeries
to reduce their cancer risk.84 They had all taken a genetic test in
78. See Sukh Makhnoon, Lauren Thomas Garrett, Wylie Burke, Deborah J. Bowen &
Brian H. Shirts, Experiences of Patients Seeking to Participate in Variant of Uncertain
Significance Reclassification Research, 10 J.CMTY.GENETICS 189, 192-93 (2019); Gina Kolata,
When Gene Tests for Breast Cancer Reveal Grim Data but No Guidance, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/12/health/breast-cancer-brca-genetic-testing.html
[https://perma.cc/LTH9-4BZE] (“It was scary. There are times I regret ever having genetic
testing.”).
79. Makhnoon et al., supra note 78, at 192. A participant in the Makhoon et al. study
expressed dismay at his or her inability to help his or her family because of the VUS
classification: “Why was I the one who got cancer? Well, because it was my job to go through
this and I’m the strong one to figure it out, and now I can save everybody else. So [the VUS]
kind of ruined my whole reason.” Id.
80. Id. at 193. 
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. See Scott A. Turner, Smita K. Rao, R. Hayes Morgan, Cindy L. Vnencak-Jones &
Georgia L. Wiesner, The Impact of Variant Classification on the Clinical Management of
Hereditary Cancer Syndromes, 21 GENETICS MED. 426, 429 (2019).
84. Amy Dockeser Marcus, A Genetic Test Led Seven Women in One Family to Have Major
Surgery. Then the Odds Changed., WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2019, 11:43 AM), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/seven-women-in-a-family-chose-surgery-after-a-genetic-test-then-the-results-
changed-11576860210 [https://perma.cc/6Y5M-GBNJ]. Because we do not know these family
members’ preferred pronouns, we have chosen to use gender-expansive pronouns (i.e. they,
them, their) when telling their story.
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2015 that had detected a mutation on one of their BRCA genes,
putting them at a heightened risk of hereditary breast and ovarian
cancer.85 All seven family members had their ovaries and fallopian
tubes removed.86 Two also underwent double mastectomies.87 Then,
in the fall of 2019, a genetic counselor called to share earth-
shattering information.88 The lab that did the family’s testing no
longer believed that they were at an increased risk.89 They had
removed their healthy organs for nothing. While the family’s genetic
variant was not a VUS at the time when they got tested—it was re-
classified from pathogenic to VUS after their surgeries—this story
demonstrates how important it is to convey accurate risk informa-
tion to patients in a timely fashion. We focus our analysis on the
reclassification of VUSs, yet it would apply with equal force to other
kinds of variant reclassification.
Finally, failing to give patients up-to-date risk information—in
genetics and beyond—could deny them the chance to seek appropri-
ate treatment. Patients may interpret a VUS as a negative result
because it does not affirmatively communicate risk or lead to a
diagnosis.90 Without the appropriate genetic counseling, VUSs may
then give patients a false sense of security, perhaps even leading
them to forgo additional screening despite their family medical
histories.91 Take our hypothetical patient.92 If she knew that she had
an increased genetic risk of cancer, her doctor could have monitored
her health more closely and either acted preventively or diagnosed
the cancer at an earlier stage. Patients—especially those with
family medical histories of cancer—may incorrectly assume that
they did not inherit certain genetic risk factors, and that assump-
tion could influence their behavior in undesirable, and even life-
threatening, ways.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See EAST ET AL., supra note 65, at 10-12 (explaining the relationship between variants
of uncertain significance and patient symptoms).
91. See Makhnoon et al., supra note 78, at 194.
92. See supra Introduction.
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A reclassified variant may also give patients crucial information
about which treatments to pursue. The recent case Williams v.
Quest Diagnostics demonstrates how.93 Williams dealt with the al-
leged misclassification of a variant known to be pathogenic as a
VUS.94 During his first year of life, Amy Williams’s son, Christian,
started having seizures.95 Over time, the seizures got worse, leading
the family to seek genetic testing.96 The lab reported that Chris-
tian’s variant of the SCN1A gene was a VUS.97 The absence of a
clear diagnosis ultimately led Christian down an unsuccessful
treatment route.98 Specifically, his doctors dismissed a diagnosis of
Dravet syndrome, a rare genetic condition that results in a serious
seizure disorder, based on the report.99 In 2008, at the age of almost
three, Christian died after a seizure.100 Years later, Williams
discovered studies—including one authored by the lab’s direc-
tor—predating Christian’s testing that linked his SCN1A variant to
Dravet syndrome.101 Tragically, he had received medications that
exacerbate seizures in people with Dravet syndrome.102 In 2016,
Williams sued the laboratory for the wrongful death of her son.103
She alleged that had he been properly diagnosed and treated,
Christian would not have suffered his fatal seizure.104
Troublingly, variant reclassification will not affect everyone
equally. The potential harms outlined above could disparately
impact certain populations. Most genetic databases contain dispro-
portionate amounts of data from people of predominantly European
descent.105 Not surprisingly then, VUSs occur more frequently in
93. 353 F. Supp. 3d 432 (D.S.C. 2018).
94. Thus, Williams is not about the failure to reinterpret genetic test results following a
reclassification, but rather is a dispute about the lab’s alleged failure to correctly interpret the
results in the first place. See id. at 437.
95. Id. at 436.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 437.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 436-37.
101. Id. at 447.
102. Id. at 437.
103. Id. at 436.
104. Id. at 437; see also Foulkes et al., supra note 20, at 155 n.16 (recounting the Williams
facts).
105. Slavin et al., supra note 58, at 1060, 1064.
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populations with non-European ancestry.106 Because those popula-
tions have higher rates of VUSs, there are more opportunities for
reclassification. In short, the more VUSs a patient has, the more
VUSs a lab can reclassify. Thus, research shows that variant
reclassification occurs more frequently in people with African and
Asian genetic ancestries.107 To be sure, genetic ancestry and race are
not coextensive categories.108 However, people of color are more
likely to have non-European ancestry, making them more vulnera-
ble to the potential harms that may result from failing to update
patients following a reclassification. Insofar as those populations
already face disadvantages, this disparate impact could, in turn,
exacerbate existing health disparities.109
To sum up, variant reclassifications can communicate valuable—
and sometimes clinically actionable—health information to patients.
If patients never receive updated results, it may prolong psychologi-
cal discomfort, engender distrust, create the opportunity for unnec-
essary medical interventions, give a false sense of security, or deny
the ability to make appropriate decisions regarding prevention,
detection, and treatment. However, it is currently unclear whether
patients can recover legally for these potential harms. Next, we turn
to the legal frameworks most likely to govern these disputes.
106. Id. at 1060; see Paul S. Appelbaum, Erik Parens, Sara M. Berger, Wendy K. Chung
& Wylie Burke, Is There a Duty to Reinterpret Genetic Data? The Ethical Dimensions, 22
GENETICS MED. 633, 634 (2020); see, e.g., Allison W. Kurian, Kevin C. Ward, Ann S. Hamilton,
Dennis M. Deapen, Paul Abrahamse, Irina Bondarenko, Yun Li, Sarah T. Hawley, Monica
Morrow, Reshma Jagsi & Steven J. Katz, Uptake, Results, and Outcomes of Germline
Multiple-Gene Sequencing After Diagnosis of Breast Cancer, 10 JAMA ONCOLOGY 1066, 1066
(2018) (observing that the switch from single-gene testing to “multiple-gene sequencing”
resulted in increased findings of “variants of uncertain significance, especially in minorities
(multiple-gene sequencing: white patients, 23.7%; black patients, 44.5%; and Asian patients,
50.9%)”).
107. See, e.g., Slavin et al., supra note 58, at 1062.
108. Trina Jones & Jessica L. Roberts, Genetic Race? DNA Ancestry Tests, Racial Identity,
& the Law, 121 COLUM.L.REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 35-36) (on file with author).
109. See Appelbaum et al., supra note 106, at 634; Arjun K. Manrai, Birgit H. Funke, Heidi
L. Rehm, Morten S. Olesen, Bradley A. Maron, Peter Szolovits, David M. Margulies, Joseph
Loscalzo & Isaac S. Kohane, Genetic Misdiagnoses and the Potential for Health Disparities,
375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 655, 662-63 (2016).
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B. Legal Background
As any first-year law student will tell you, negligence principles
describe legal responsibilities in terms of “duties.”110 To sue for
negligence, a plaintiff must typically establish four elements: (1) the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the defendant
breached that duty; (3) the patient suffered a legally cognizable
injury; and (4) the breach caused that injury.111 Here we deal only
with the crucial first steps on the path to liability: should laborato-
ries and physicians have legal duties associated with variant
reclassification? And what kinds of conduct should constitute a
breach of those duties? As such, we leave a variety of intrigu-
ing—and essential—legal questions with respect to causation and
damages unanswered. We turn first to duty.
1. Duties
Courts recognize duties for several reasons. As one set of scholars
put it, in recognizing a legal duty, courts are “really just saying that
for reasons of policy or principle, liability ought or ought not to
attach in this case.”112 Yet, despite the harms described in the
previous Subsection, reclassifying a VUS does not trigger any
clearly recognized legal duties.113 That is not to say that courts
would be unwilling to find liability, but it appears that no court has
addressed these issues head-on yet. The lack of applicable cases
could be due, at least in part, to the relative novelty of genetic
science. A recent study revealed that—despite the potential for
liability—less than a dozen reported genomic malpractice cases are
litigated each year.114 Thus, patients may not have filed claims
110. DAVID HOWARTH, MARTIN MATTHEWS, JONATHAN MORGAN, JANET O’SULLIVAN &
STELIOS TOFARIS, HEPPLE AND MATTHEWS’ TORT LAW 1 (2015).
111. See 70 C.J.S. Physicians & Surgeons § 122 (2020); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 281-82 (AM. L. INST. 1965).
112. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point
of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1579 (2006).
113. See, e.g., Ellen Otten, Mirjam Plantinga, Erwin Birnie, Marian A. Verkerk, Anneke
M. Lucassen, Adelita V. Ranchor & Irene M. Van Langen, Is There a Duty to Recontact in
Light of New Genetic Technologies? A Systematic Review of the Literature, 17 GENETICS MED.
668, 674 (2015). 
114. See Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, Genomic Malpractice: An Emerging Tide
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related to variant reclassification because the opportunity for
reclassification and reanalysis simply did not exist. Here, we
consider the bodies of tort law that courts would likely consider
when deciding whether to recognize duties related to variant
reclassification.
a. Professional Negligence
Because patients undergo genetic testing as part of their care,
medical malpractice law could presumably apply.115 Medical
malpractice law is a form of professional negligence,116 with health
care providers acting as their patients’ fiduciaries.117 Hence, wheth-
er medical malpractice law applies involves two important threshold
inquiries: (1) whether the defendant is, in fact, a health care
provider who could potentially owe patients heightened duties and
(2) whether a sufficient treatment relationship existed between the
plaintiff and the defendant to trigger those fiduciary obligations.118
Physicians who see patients certainly meet the legal definition of
health care providers.119 Thus, medical malpractice law applies to a
physician who orders a genetic test. However, the laboratories that
process those tests—and ultimately make the decision to reclassify
a variant—present greater ambiguity. States are currently split on
this issue.120 Whether the laboratories that reclassify genetic
or Gentle Ripple?, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 15, 35-36 (2018) (attributing the low number of
cases to the slow uptake of genetic medicine by providers and the lack of interest in such
claims by lawyers).
115. Sonny B. Bal, An Introduction to Medical Malpractice in the United States, 2 CLINICAL
ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RSCH. 339, 340 (2008).
116. It involves a special relationship that warrants a greater duty of care than what
ordinary negligence requires. Unequal power within the relationship forms the basis for these
increased obligations. See Nadia M. Sawicki, Choosing Medical Malpractice, 93 WASH.L.REV.
891, 936 (2018).
117. Jessica Mantel, Refusing to Treat Noncompliant Patients Is Bad Medicine, 39 CARDOZO
L. REV. 127, 153 (2017).
118. Bal, supra note 115, at 342.
119. See Sawicki, supra note 116, at 936.
120. We conducted a fifty-state survey examining whether clinical labs are health care
providers for purposes of malpractice law. We found that six states expressly include
laboratories, or their personnel, in their medical malpractice statute’s definition of health care
provider. Foulkes et al., supra note 20, at 160-61. For the remaining states, we looked to
judicial opinions. The courts in fifteen states have held that clinical laboratories meet the
medical malpractice definition of health care provider. Id. The South Carolina Supreme Court
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variants are health care providers could impact the outcomes of
these cases. In addition to requiring a heightened duty of care,
medical malpractice law may invoke caps on damages,121 shorter
statutes of limitations,122 statutes of repose,123 and procedural
idiosyncrasies.124 In fact, the lab in Williams argued in favor of
being classified as a health care provider to invoke the shorter
statute of limitations and to assert that the case was time barred.125
However, establishing that the defendant is a health care pro-
vider is not sufficient to warrant a heightened duty of care. The
plaintiff must usually also demonstrate that she was the defen-
dant’s patient at the time of the alleged wrongdoing.126 Generally,
the provider’s obligations to the patient begin and end with the
treatment relationship.127 In most cases, when the treatment
decided this issue as part of the Williams litigation in response to a certified question from
the federal court that heard the case. See Williams v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 816 S.E.2d 564,
566 (S.C. 2018). Courts in four states came to the opposite conclusion, holding that medical
malpractice law should not apply to clinical labs. Foulkes et al., supra note 20, at 160-61. That
leaves twenty-five states without a clear answer on this important threshold question. Id.
121. Sometimes compensatory damages are limited; other caps restrict noneconomic
damages. Malpractice Caps in All 50 States, MILLER & ZOIS: ATT’YS AT L. (2020),
https://www.millerandzois.com/malpractice-damage-caps.html [https://perma.cc/Q9YL-NP58].
Malpractice legislation often caps damages, placing limits on recovery ranging from $250,000
to $2,250,000. Id. Note that courts in some states have found caps to be in violation of the
state constitution. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156, 171 (Ala. 1991)
(declaring the $400,000 damage cap unconstitutional).
122. Malpractice laws also often incorporate statutes of limitations different than those for
ordinary negligence claims. See Foulkes et al., supra note 20, at 157.
123. See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 114, at 26. These statutes are significant, as they
do not allow equitable tolling based on when the plaintiff discovered, or should have dis-
covered, the cause of action. See id.
124. Some compel arbitration, while others modify expert witness standards or shift the
costs and burdens of litigation from the provider to the injured patient. See Lauren K.
Saunders, The Quest for Balance: Public Policy & Due Process in Medical Malpractice Arbi-
tration Agreements, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 267, 268 (1986); see also Foulkes et al., supra note
20, at 156-57.
125. Williams, 816 S.E.2d at 565.
126. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
127. The requirements for establishing the treatment relationship differ by jurisdiction.
Compare Crisp Reg’l Hosp., Inc. v. Oliver, 621 S.E.2d 554, 560 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (“The
relationship is considered consensual where the patient knowingly seeks the assistance of the
physician and the physician knowingly accepts him as a patient.” (citing Peace v. Weisman,
368 S.E.2d 319 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982)),
with Oja v. Kin, 581 N.W.2d 739, 741 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (“A physician-patient relationship
exists where a doctor renders professional services to a person who has contracted for such
services.” (quoting Hill v. Kokosky, 463 N.W.2d 265 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990))). Consent by both
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relationship is over, the provider no longer has heightened duties.128
Important to our analysis here is that certain providers, such as
geneticists, may see many of their patients only once. However, it
is possible that learning of a clinically actionable variant reclassifi-
cation could—on its own—trigger a duty to the patient.129
Malpractice law requires health care providers to conform to the
applicable standard of care.130 Courts typically determine the
standard of care in one of two ways: (1) as a matter of professional
custom131 or (2) as a matter of reasonableness.132 Professional cus-
tom presumes that providers who do not follow the accepted
practices within their specialties have been negligent.133 Providers
parties, however, is traditionally enough. See Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 941 (Kan. 2001) (“A
physician-patient relationship is consensual.” (quoting Adams v. Via Christi Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
19 P.3d 132 (Kan. 2001))). But note also that an “implied physician-patient relationship may
arise when a physician gives advice to a patient, even if that advice is communicated through
another health care professional.” Campbell v. Haber, 710 N.Y.S.2d 495, 495 (N.Y. App. Div.
2000). There must be more than an “informal interest and involvement in the patient’s
condition.” Id. (quoting Cogswell v. Chapman, 672 N.Y.S.2d 460 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)).
Terminating the treatment relationship typically requires some kind of specific action on the
part of either the patient or the provider. For example, both could agree to terminate the
relationship, the patient could dismiss the provider, the patient may no longer need the
provider’s services, or the provider could withdraw from the case. 46 AM. JUR. 2d Proof of
Facts § 373 (2020) (collecting cases, notably citing Tierney v. Univ. of Mich. Regents, 669
N.W.2d 575 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003)).
128. For example, following treatment, a doctor might breach her duty by not alerting a
patient that she needs follow-up care. Theresa K. Porter, Cause of Action Against Physician
or Surgeon for Breach of the Duty of Attention and Care, 21 CAUSES OF ACTION 1 (2020)
(collecting cases).
129. See, e.g., Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 595 (M.D.N.C.), aff’d sub nom. Stuart
v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014).
130. See Thomas v. Burack, No. 35782/04, 2009 WL 4481656, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 21,
2009) (explaining how the standard of care is established and noting that malpractice
jurisprudence has evolved to accommodate advances in medicine).
131. JAMES A. HENDERSON, DOUGLAS A. KYSAR & RICHARD N. PEARSON, THE TORTS PRO-
CESS 234 (9th ed. 2017) (“For most courts in medical malpractice cases, professional custom
is not just evidence of the standard of care, it is the standard of care.”); WILLIAM P. STATSKY,
ESSENTIALS OF TORTS 131, 178-79 (3d ed. 2012).
132. Phillip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at
the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 201 (2000) (noting that there is no longer a
judicial consensus favoring deference to custom in medical malpractice litigation).
133. Trimarco v. Klein, 436 N.E.2d 502, 505-06 (N.Y. 1982) (explaining that although
deviation from custom creates a presumption of negligence, the jury must also determine
whether the custom was reasonable); see also Peter Moffett & Gregory Moore, The Standard
of Care: Legal History and Definitions: The Bad and Good News, 12 W.J. EMERGENCY MED.
109, 109 (2011) (explaining that the jury must decide “whether this ‘custom’ was reasonable
and whether the deviation from this ‘custom’ was so unreasonable as to cause harm”).
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can rebut that presumption by showing that the custom itself is
unreasonable.134 While courts previously looked to the medical
customs of the locality where the defendant practiced (the “locality
rule”),135 many states have recently turned to a national standard.136
And some jurisdictions have moved away from professional custom
altogether, instead adopting a reasonableness standard.137 Reason-
ableness simply asks whether the provider acted like a reasonably
prudent person under the circumstances.138 This move represents a
trend toward a single reasonableness standard for all of tort
litigation.139 More than a dozen states have explicitly rejected
professional custom in medical malpractice,140 and at least nine
others articulate their standard in terms of reasonableness.141
One particularly salient feature of medical malpractice law is a
willingness to consider not only the defendant’s area of expertise but
also her available resources.142 Historically, courts were reluctant to
hold rural family doctors with humble medical practices to the same
standards as health care providers seeing patients in high-tech
medical facilities with access to cutting-edge technologies.143 Hence,
134. Moffett & Moore, supra note 133, at 109.
135. HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 131, at 235.
136. Id. (citing Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968); Hawes v. Chua, 769 A.2d
797 (D.C. 2001)). There are, of course, exceptions. For example, Arizona still uses local
custom, not reasonableness. Peters, supra note 132, at 182.
137. See Peters, supra note 132, at 201.
138. Id. at 177. To make this determination, courts look to the practices of others in the
trade. Id. Failing to adhere to professional custom typically shifts the burden onto the
defendant to show that the custom itself is unreasonable. See, e.g., supra notes 133-34 and
accompanying text. This is a heavy burden for a defendant to meet; for example, some courts
allow for directed verdicts when a health care professional has failed to comply with a
professional standard of care established through expert witnesses. See, e.g., Hurlock v. Park
Lane Med. Ctr., Inc., 709 S.W.2d 872, 884 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
139. Peters, supra note 132, at 201.
140. Id. at 164. 
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., N.C.GEN.STAT. § 90-21.12(a) (2019) (codifying the requirements of standard
of care); TENN.CODE ANN. § 29-26-115 (2020); Shipley v. Williams, 350 S.W.3d 527, 571 (Tenn.
2011) (holding that to testify as an expert witness, a medical professional must have at least
some knowledge of the applicable community’s medical resources); Barham v. Hawk, 600
S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that one issue was whether an expert witness was
sufficiently familiar with the medical resources available in defendant’s community).
143. See G.E. Hall, The “Locality” Rule, 207 JAMA 627, 627 (1969); Causes of Action Under
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 2012 U.S. Comp. Gen., B-322525, *1 (Mar. 23,
2012).
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the locality rule baked the defendant’s resources into the standard
of care.144 However, as technology has made information more
readily available—regardless of location—some courts have moved
away from the locality rule.145 Yet, even in jurisdictions with a
national professional custom or reasonableness standard, courts
have considered a health care provider’s resources when deciding
liability.146 Yet, as discussed below, those inquiries may relate not
to the standard of care but rather to breach.
Beyond the general standard of care, courts may also identify
specific duties that providers owe their patients. While no cases
have dealt with variant reclassification directly, courts have recog-
nized certain relevant legal duties, such as (1) the duty to continue
treatment; (2) the duty to warn patients of foreseeable risk; and
(3) the duty to address incidental or secondary findings.147
144. Michelle Huckaby Lewis, John K. Gohagan & Daniel J. Merenstein, The Locality Rule
and the Physician’s Dilemma: Local Medical Practices vs. the National Standard of Care, 297
JAMA 2633, 2634 (2007). To establish the standard of care, experts would testify about what
it would be like to practice under the defendant’s specific circumstances. See, e.g., Shipley, 350
S.W.3d at 532 (“Claimants are required by statute to prove by expert testimony the recognized
standard of acceptable professional practice in the community where the defendant medical
provider practices or a similar community.”); see also Bal, supra note 115, at 342 (indicating
that expert witness testimony is essential to establishing breach of a standard of professional
care).
145. Peters, supra note 132, at 201.
146. The distinction between jurisdictions that have adopted a national standard and those
that adhere to a locality rule is not a clear one, and these cases often still regularly include
the presentation of expert testimony. See, e.g., Bates v. Dodge City Healthcare Grp., 291 P.3d
1042, 1049 (Kan. 2013) (explicitly recognizing the coexistence of the locality rule and a
national standard and noting that available resources “‘is simply one of the factors to be
considered’ in the standard of care” (quoting Chandler v. Neosho Mem’l Hosp., 574 P.2d 136
(Kan. 1977))); D’Orta v. Margaretville Mem’l Hosp., 62 N.Y.S.3d 620, 623 (N.Y. App. Div.
2017) (holding that defendant hospital met their burden of showing the standard of care was
not breached by submitting an affiant’s testimony as to the hospital’s resources); Ervin ex rel.
Wrongful Death Beneficiaries v. Delta Reg’l Med. Ctr., 55 So. 3d 190, 193 (Miss. Ct. App.
2010) (noting the jurisdiction’s inclusions of a resource-based component to the physician’s
nondelegable duty of care); Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr., 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 707,
713 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]here may be areas of medicine in which geographic location is
especially relevant to a determination of an expert witness’s qualifications. For example, some
locations may only have access to limited resources.”).
147. See Stevens et al., supra note 19, at n.6 and accompanying text (citing A.G.W. Hunter,
N. Sharpe, M. Mullen, W.S. Meschino, Ethical, Legal, and Practical Concerns About Recon-
tacting Patients to Inform Them of New Information: The Case in Medical Genetics, 103 AM.
J. MED. GENETICS 265, 267, 270-71 (2001)).
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The duty to continue treating comes from the doctrine of abandon-
ment.148 To prove abandonment, the patient must demonstrate that
her provider stopped treating her so abruptly while she still needed
care that she could not find a suitable replacement.149 Following a
variant reclassification, the duty to continue treatment could poten-
tially obligate a provider to update the patient’s results and share
that information.
Second, courts have recognized a duty to warn of foreseeable risks
in certain cases, such as following Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) recalls.150 Thus, a court could theoretically find that a pro-
vider has a duty to warn her patients following a variant reclassifi-
cation, especially when the updated results contain clinically
actionable health information.
Finally, providers may also have a duty to address clinically
actionable incidental or secondary findings.151 When laboratories
148. See, e.g., Cole v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, 185 S.W.3d 740, 744-45 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006)
(describing treatment as “covering all the steps taken to effect a cure of an injury or disease;
including examination and diagnosis as well as application of remedies” (citing BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1502 (6th ed. 1990))).
149. See Burnett v. Layman, 181 S.W. 157, 158 (Tenn. 1915) (involving a physician who
performed a procedure on his patient’s bladder and, when he heard a popping sound, the
physician told his patient that he needed a surgeon and left immediately without any further
communication). Of course, it is not enough to show patient dumping. The abandonment must
have directly caused the patient’s injury. Barbara E. Calfee, What You Don’t Know Will Hurt
You: Physicians’ Duty to Warn Patients About Newly Discovered Dangers in Previously
Initiated Treatment, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 649, 665 (1982).
150. The Indiana Supreme Court held that a health care provider who is aware of a
treatment’s potentially dangerous side effects may have a duty to warn her patients following
an FDA recall. Cox v. Paul, 828 N.E.2d 907, 913-14 (Ind. 2005). Although far from universally
accepted, some courts have extended the duty to warn to third parties—mainly family
members—if a condition is inheritable. See Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 280 (Fla. 1995);
Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). However,
Congress enacted the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),
which limits the ability of health care providers to disclose their patients’ protected health
information. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500 to 534. Thus, if the warning involves private health
data, federal law may limit the ability to warn third parties. Mark A. Rothstein,
Reconsidering the Duty to Warn Genetically At-Risk Relatives, 20 GENETICS MED. 285, 287
(2018). Regardless, at least one recent decision has found that providers may have a limited
duty to warn their patients of potentially deadly genetic risks. See Safer, 677 A.2d at 1192.
151. Incidental findings are medical information discovered in the course of a screening or
test that is unrelated to the reason for that test, such as when a radiologist finds a pancreatic
cyst during a liver scan. See Lo v. Burke, 455 S.E.2d 9, 10 (Va. 1995); Lincoln L. Berland,
Stuart G. Silverman, Richard M. Gore, William W. Mayo-Smith, Alec J. Megibow, Judy Yee,
James A. Brink, Mark E. Baker, Michael P. Federle, W. Dennis Foley, Isaac R. Francis, Brian
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handle massive amounts of genetic data, such as in the context of
full genome or exome sequencing, they might find genetic risk
factors unrelated to the reason for testing.152 That is to say, these
technologies open the door for potential secondary findings.153 The
ACMG created significant controversy in 2013 by recommending
that labs providing whole exome or whole genome sequencing
analyze—and return results from—over fifty genes with highly
penetrant, actionable pathogenic variants, regardless of the clinical
R. Herts, Gary M. Israel, Glenn Krinsky, Joel F. Platt, William P. Shuman & Andrew J.
Taylor, Managing Incidental Findings on Abdominal CT: White Paper of the ACR Incidental
Findings Committee, 7 J. AM. COLL. RADIOLOGY 754, 754 (2010). Incidental findings can also
occur in research. See Benjamin D. Solomon, Donald W. Hadley, Daniel E. Pineda-Alvarez,
Aparna Kamat, Jamie K. Teer, Praveen F. Cherukuri, Nancy F. Hansen, Pedro Cruz, Alice
C. Young, Benjamin E. Berkman, Settara C. Chandrasekharappa & James C. Mullikin,
Incidental Medical Information in Whole-Exome Sequencing, 129 PEDIATRICS 1605, 1606
(2012).
152. See Lainie Friedman Ross, Mark A. Rothstein & Ellen Wright Clayton, Mandatory
Extended Searches in All Genome Sequencing: “Incidental Findings,” Patient Autonomy, and
Shared Decision Making, 310 JAMA 367, 367 (2013).
153. The ACMG uses the phrase “secondary” findings while others refer to these as
“incidental” findings. See Isaac S. Kohane, Daniel R. Masys & Russ B. Altman, The
Incidentalome: A Threat to Genomic Medicine, 296 JAMA 212, 212 (2006); Joel B. Krier &
Robert C. Green, Management of Incidental Findings in Clinical Genomic Sequencing, 87
CURRENT PROTOCOLS HUM.GENETICS 9, 9 (2015); Susan M. Wolf, Frances P. Lawrenz, Charles
A. Nelson, Jeffrey P. Kahn, Mildred K. Cho, Ellen Wright Clayton, Joel G. Fletcher, Michael
K. Georgieff, Dale Hammerschmidt, Kathy Hudson, Judy Illes, Vivek Kapur, Moira A. Keane,
Barbara A. Koenig, Bonnie S. LeRoy, Elizabeth G. McFarland, Jordan Paradise, Lisa S.
Parker, Sharon F. Terry, Brian Van Ness & Benjamin S. Wilfond, Managing Incidental
Findings in Human Subjects Research: Analysis and Recommendations, 36 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 219, 220 (2008) (“Commentators are beginning to recognize the tremendous
importance of [incidental findings] in genetic and genomic research, particularly as we now
face a genomic revolution in medicine.”).
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reasons for the sequencing.154 Thus, some providers could arguably
have duties to return incidental or secondary findings.
b. Ordinary Negligence
Importantly, not all legal duties require professional judgments
or occur in the context of fiduciary relationships. Absent a profes-
sional or fiduciary relationship, plaintiffs can sue defendants—
including health care providers—for ordinary negligence.155
Ordinary negligence simply requires that providers of products or
services act reasonably.156 Whether a court decides to apply medical
malpractice or ordinary negligence will depend on the facts of the
case, usually whether the health care provider was rendering
medical services.157 Ordinary negligence may also provide a useful
154. See, e.g., Wylie Burke, Armand H. Matheny Antommaria, Robin Bennett, Jeffrey
Botkin, Ellen Wright Clayton, Gail E. Henderson, Ingrid A. Holm, Gail P. Jarvik, Muin J.
Khoury, Bartha Maria Knoppers, Nancy A. Press, Lainie Friedman Ross, Mark A. Rothstein,
Howard Saal, Wendy R. Uhlmann, Benjamin Wilfond, Susan M. Wolf & Ron Zimmern,
Recommendations for Returning Genomic Incidental Findings? We Need to Talk!, 15 GENETICS
MED. 854, 854 (2013) (calling the ACMG conclusions “premature practice recommendations,”
and calling “for robust dialogue among stakeholders to define a pathway to normatively
sound, evidence-based guidelines”). The ACMG, therefore, supported analyzing and reporting
clinically actionable secondary findings related to certain conditions. Id. at 854-55. Physicians,
geneticists, bioethicists, and law professors spoke out against the policy as a violation of
patients’ rights. See Robert Klitzman, Paul S. Appelbaum & Wendy Chung, Return of
Secondary Genomic Findings vs. Patient Autonomy: Implications for Medical Care, 310 JAMA
369, 369-70 (2013); Ross et al., supra note 152, at 367.
155. See supra Part I.B.1.
156. See supra Part I.B.1. Likewise, a health care provider must act reasonably with
respect to her “nonmedical, administrative, ministerial, or routine care.” Williams v. Quest
Diagnostics, Inc., 816 S.E.2d 564, 565 n.2 (S.C. 2018) (quoting Dawkins v. Union Hosp. Dist.,
758 S.E.2d 501, 504 (S.C. 2014)). Say a patient slips and falls in a hospital. In many
jurisdictions, negligence will turn on reasonableness—not a professional standard of care—
much as if the person had taken a tumble in a grocery store. See id. In the context of variant
reclassification, to successfully sue, plaintiffs must establish that it was unreasonable for the
defendant to fail to take action in light of the reclassification. See id.
157. Annunziata v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 8 N.Y.S.3d 168, 168-69 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015);
see Est. of French v. Stratford House, 333 S.W.3d 546, 569 (Tenn. 2011) (Koch, Jr., J.,
dissenting); Dyer v. Trachtman, 679 N.W.2d 311, 317 (Mich. 2004). For example, in
Annunziata, a plaintiff sued a lab for allegedly misreading a tissue sample test, thereby
delaying the detection of cervical cancer. 8 N.Y.S.3d at 168-69. Along with malpractice claims,
the plaintiff brought a claim for ordinary negligence, in which she accused the lab of failing
to properly employ a plan for error reduction and quality assurance. Id. Because the plaintiff’s
ordinary negligence claim would not be actionable absent the malpractice claim, the court
dismissed the ordinary negligence claim. Id. In contrast, when the conduct of the lab or
2020] GENETIC DUTIES 171
alternative to medical malpractice. In Williams, the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that the lab was a health care provider and,
therefore, subject to the shorter statute of limitations for medical
malpractice.158 However, the federal district court hearing the case
declined to dismiss the lawsuit, despite the untimely malpractice
claims, reasoning that Williams could still have claims for ordinary
negligence.159 Although some states allow plaintiffs to sue doctors
only for medical malpractice, ordinary negligence may be an impor-
tant framework for liability in variant reclassification cases in the
jurisdictions that allow it.160
In sum, courts confronted with torts claims related to variant
reclassification could approach the potential legal duties at stake
from a variety of different vantages. These duties could be part and
parcel of medical malpractice’s standard of care, a special profes-
sional duty imposed on labs and doctors, or a matter of ordinary
negligence. Yet, regardless of which body of law courts choose, many
jurisdictions will—as a practical matter—likely apply a reasonable-
ness standard.161 To start, the reasonableness standard for medical
malpractice operates almost identically to ordinary negligence: both
standards ask what the reasonable lab or physician would do.162
Courts could also resort to reasonableness when assessing profes-
sional customs or imposing other kinds of professional duties.
Without accepted policies or practices to consider, courts may simply
turn to whether it was reasonable to reinterpret results or to
physician was incidental—opposed to integral—to medical treatment, courts have employed
ordinary negligence. See, e.g., Pascarelli v. Corning Clinical Lab’ys, Inc., No. 325312, 1997 WL
155381, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 1997) (employing ordinary negligence after
concluding that alleged negligent communication of lab results did not rise to the level of a
medical malpractice claim because no uniquely medical issues were required to be
determined); Delaney v. Newington Children’s Hosp., No. CV-93-0524063, 1994 WL 228322,
at *1-2 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 9, 1994) (applying ordinary negligence after concluding that
alleged negligent supervision of minor psychiatric patient did not amount to a medical
malpractice claim because no uniquely medical issues were required to be determined).
158. See Williams, 816 S.E.2d at 566.
159. See Williams v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 3d 432, 445 (D.S.C. 2018)
(denying summary judgment on claims against a genetics lab, despite malpractice actions
being time barred, because some claims were still sound in ordinary negligence). 
160. See id.
161. See, e.g., Dyer, 679 N.W.2d at 316.
162. See id.
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recontact the patient under the circumstances.163 Thus, despite the
variety of potential legal frameworks, liability will most likely boil
down to the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct.
2. Breach
Among the most popular approaches to deciding tort liability is
Learned Hand’s test for negligence. Under this formula, parties who
engage in potentially costly behaviors should consider three factors
before acting: (1) the probability of an injury, (2) the severity of that
injury, and (3) the costs of precautions to avoid the injury.164 Put in
reasonableness terms, a defendant acts unreasonably by failing to
take precautions if the benefit of avoiding the injury outweighs the
costs of preventing it.165 Thus, courts will look to the Learned Hand
formula when deciding what constitutes a breach of reasonable
care.166
Resources could then factor into the reasonableness of the
defendant’s conduct following a variant reclassification. While the
probability and severity of the patient’s injuries may remain
constant, the costs of avoiding that injury might vary from defen-
dant to defendant.167 For example, given her BRCA1 mutation, the
patient from the Introduction had a 50 to 85 percent chance of
developing breast cancer by age seventy.168 This risk speaks to both
the probability and severity of her potential injury.169 Other relevant
factors include the available treatment options and the likely
163. Simply, custom is common practice. See T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
Where no custom has been established, what is objectively reasonable is a logical guidepost.
See James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the Continued
Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1386-87
(1994).
164. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[I]f the
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is
less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.”).
165. See, e.g., McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1558 (7th Cir. 1987).
166. See id.
167. See Rachael Rettner, Ovarian, Breast Cancer Risk Vary According to Subtle Changes
in Two Genes, SCI. AM. (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ovarian-
breast-cancer-risk-vary-according-to-subtle-changes-in-two-genes/ [https://perma.cc/RY5N-
QMJ6].
168. Id.
169. See id.
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survival rates.170 These circumstances would be the same regardless
of which physician ordered the BRCA1 test.171
However, recontacting the patient could impose different costs on
a physician, depending on the situation. On one hand, recontacting
would appear to be more costly for a rural family doctor than for a
geneticist practicing in a state-of-the-art medical center.172 The
family doctor has a less comprehensive knowledge of genetics, sees
patients for a diversity of medical issues, and has fewer resources
at her disposal. Tracking down patients following a variant
reclassification could consequently seem more burdensome as
compared to a highly specialized geneticist with access to cutting-
edge tools. On the other hand, the opposite could also be true. A
rural family doctor likely knows all of her patients and how to
contact them. It could be as easy as picking up the phone. In
contrast, a geneticist at a major medical center may see large
numbers of patients but only once or twice. The geneticist might not
recall a patient from several years ago and could need time to
review the patient’s record. Moreover, both the patient’s health and
contact information could have changed over the years. Breach is,
therefore, a very fact-intensive inquiry. What might be reasonable
for one defendant could be unreasonable for another. In fact, what
might be reasonable for one rural family doctor could be unreason-
able for another rural family doctor, depending on the circum-
stances.173
As the discussion above suggests, calculating the costs and
benefits of reinterpreting results and recontacting patients may not
always be a straightforward math problem. As Judge Richard
Posner pointed out, juries rarely have the quantified variables
necessary for truly performing the Learned Hand analysis.174 Thus,
the test “has greater analytic than operational significance.”175 Put
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. These and other scenarios discussed throughout the Article were developed in
conversation with our colleagues on the grant. We based these examples on our understanding
of the experiences of health care providers and labs in dealing with these issues.
173. We explore these possible variations in greater detail with our case studies in Part III.
174. McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.)
(“Conceptual as well as practical difficulties in monetizing personal injuries may continue to
frustrate efforts to measure expected accident costs.”).
175. Id.
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another way, juries rely more on their intuitions of reasonableness
than actual cost-benefit analysis.176 Nonetheless, we find the Learn-
ed Hand test useful in thinking through the potential breaches of
genetic duties that we explore in Part III.
3. Causation, Damages, and Defenses
As noted, we focus our analysis here on duty and breach. Of
course, plaintiffs also need to show that the defendant’s breach
actually injured them.177 Simply demonstrating that the lab or the
ordering physician failed to provide updated results will not be
sufficient.178 If no clear harm resulted from failing to give the
patient reinterpreted results post-reclassification, then she cannot
recover.179 For these reasons, we have confined our analysis only to
reclassifications that communicate clinically actionable information.
But even then, only patients who have actually manifested a genetic
condition may have valid claims.180 For example, if a lab failed to
communicate that it reclassified a patient’s BRCA1 VUS as
pathogenic but that patient never develops breast or ovarian cancer,
she may not have experienced a legally actionable harm.
Proving a legally cognizable injury could even pose challenges
when patients get sick and die. In cases of highly deadly, un-
preventable diseases, patients may die no matter what, even with
the knowledge of their greater genetic risk and access to earlier
intervention and treatment. Even if the hypothetical patient from
the Introduction was aware of her increased breast cancer risk, it is
hard to predict what difference knowing and acting on that risk
might have made. Would she have had prophylactic surgeries? Or
caught the cancer sooner and survived? And if the cancer had been
diagnosed at an earlier stage, how much longer would she have
lived? One year? Five years? Twenty-five years? Or perhaps, early
detection and intervention would not have made a difference and
she would have died anyway. What is the injury of failing to notify
176. See id.
177. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
180. But see supra Part I.A.2 (arguing for the legal duties to reinterpret and recontact
extending to benign reclassifications).
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the patient in those cases? No one—including judges and juries—
can know for sure.181
Moreover, it is not enough to simply show that the patient
suffered an injury following the defendant’s breach. She must also
demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct actually and proximately
caused that harm.182 Proximate cause requires that the injury be
foreseeable.183 While it might seem that reclassifying a VUS as
pathogenic clearly communicates a foreseeable risk,184 genetics
involves probabilities.185 Even clinically actionable genetic informa-
tion does not perfectly predict health outcomes. Sometimes the
causation inquiry will be relatively straightforward. For example,
in Williams, the lab’s allegedly negligent misclassification led
Christian’s care team to pursue a treatment shown to exacer-
bate—not reduce—seizures in patients with Dravet syndrome.186
Williams could, therefore, draw a causal link from the negligence to
the harm. But in cases in which the failure to share updated results
denies the patient access to prevention and treatment, the connec-
tion between the breach and the injury is less clear. Put differently,
what killed our hypothetical patient? The failure to give her clin-
ically actionable genetic information or breast cancer? Courts may
struggle with whether failing to reinterpret or to recontact actually
caused the harm the patient experienced.
Even if a patient presents a convincing prima facie case, the labs
and physicians may have defenses at their disposal that will allow
them to escape liability.187 For example, in cases in which patients
181. That will not, however, prevent them from trying to guess. In some jurisdictions,
plaintiffs can sue for the “loss of a chance.” See, e.g., Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green, 836
N.W.2d 321, 336-37 (Minn. 2013) (“Minnesota law permits a patient to recover damages when
a physician’s negligence diminishes or destroys a patient’s chance of recovery or survival.”);
Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 823 (Mass. 2008) (permitting recovery for loss of
chance in case of medical injury); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 475
(Okla. 1987) (adopting “the loss of chance doctrine in Oklahoma”).
182. See generally Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735
(1985) (detailing the causation requirement in tort litigation).
183. See, e.g., KEITH N. HYLTON, TORT LAW: A MODERN PERSPECTIVE 248 (2016).
184. See Brawn v. Oral Surgery Assocs., 819 A.2d 1014, 1028 (Me. 2003).
185. DANIEL L. HARTL & ELIZABETH W. JONES, ESSENTIAL GENETICS: A GENOMICS
PERSPECTIVE 105 (4th ed. 2006).
186. See Williams v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 3d 432, 437 (D.S.C. 2018).
187. See generally Kirby v. Larson, 256 N.W.2d 400 (Mich. 1977) (discussing the long
history of contributory and comparative negligence in the United States).
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fail to keep their contact information up to date, courts may apply
doctrines of comparative or contributory negligence to limit the
physician’s liability for failing to recontact.188
Moreover, several agreements—both formal and informal—are
lurking in the background of these issues. Clinical laboratories have
terms of service that will likely apply to these disputes.189 These
terms may include a variety of provisions that could affect a
patient’s ability to recover, such as arbitration clauses and choice-of-
law clauses.190 And while not exactly contracts per se, patients also
enter into agreements with their health care providers.191 The
treatment relationship itself is “quasi-contractual.”192 The doctor
triggers her fiduciary duties by accepting the patient.193 Likewise,
patients consent to various tests and treatments, sometimes signing
forms that explain the risks and benefits. Further, even fiduciaries
may be able to contract around their obligations.194 Laboratories in
particular may try to define the scope of their liability related to re-
interpreting results or contacting doctors in their terms of service.195
They could go as far as trying to waive their liability.196 Should such
waivers become boilerplate provisions of their terms of service, that
development could undermine a patient’s ability to recover for the
failure to reinterpret.
188. See id. at 413-25 (discussing the history of comparative and contributory negligence,
the relationship between the doctrines, and their application in several states).
189. See infra note 307 and accompanying text.
190. See Michael Scopulous & Jeffrey J. Segal, Limiting Exposure to Medical Malpractice
Claims and Defamatory Cyber Postings via Patient Contracts, 467 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS
& RELATED RSCH. 427, 427 (2009).
191. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
193. See Mantel, supra note 117, at 153.
194. See Scopulous & Segal, supra note 190, at 427; see also Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357,
361-62 (Utah 1996) (holding that an arbitration clause requiring an arbitration panel of
neutrally selected physicians was not substantively unconscionable); Sanford v. Castleton
Health Care Ctr., LLC, 813 N.E.2d 411, 419-20 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“[Q]ualified providers
need to be cognizant that, should they include these exclusive arbitration clauses in their
contracts, they might be relinquishing ... their right to avail themselves of the Medical
Malpractice Act.”). But see Hernandez v. Crespo, 211 So. 3d 19, 27 (Fla. 2016) (“We find that
arbitration agreements which change the cost, award, and fairness incentives of the [Medical
Malpractice Act’s] statutory provisions ... are ... void as against public policy.”).
195. See infra Part III.A.1.
196. See, e.g., Scopulous & Segal, supra note 190, at 427.
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While we confine our analysis to duty and breach, we nonetheless
acknowledge the complexities that these additional issues raise for
courts. Thus, recognizing genetic duties is simply the first step on
the road to liability, not a guarantee that patients will recover.
* * * 
While our genetic makeups remain relatively stable across our
lifetimes, the scientific understanding of our genomes is always in
flux. Sometimes new research reveals previously unknown informa-
tion about a patient’s genetics. That new understanding can have a
profound impact on a person’s emotional and physical health.
Despite these serious implications, no clearly recognized legal duty
requires any action when a laboratory reclassifies a VUS. The next
Part turns to what legal duties—if any—laboratories and physicians
should have to encourage them to share that new information with
their patients.
II. IMPOSING GENETIC DUTIES
Growing knowledge about the genome may lead labs to reclassify
VUSs. However, patients cannot benefit from that reclassification
without updated genetic test results. Here, we consider the argu-
ments in favor of imposing legal duties to reanalyze genetic test
results and to inform patients after a laboratory reclassifies a VUS.
We conclude that while laboratories are in the best position to
reinterpret results, ordering physicians are in the best position to
recontact patients.
A. In Favor of Genetic Duties
Legal duties communicate important social values. When deciding
whether to impose a legal duty, courts will look to any number of
factors, “including the guidance of history, our continually refined
concepts of morals and justice, the convenience of the rule, and
social judgment as to where the loss should fall.”197 Here, we
197. Tresemer v. Barke, 150 Cal. Rptr. 384, 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). This proposition
stems from a law review article authored by Professor Prosser and recently has been
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consider whether the law should include a duty to inform patients
following a variant reclassification. We draw our analysis from
professional ethics and norms, tort theories, and tort doctrine.
1. Professional Ethics & Norms
Experts in both biomedical ethics and genetics support recogniz-
ing duties related to variant reclassification. A recent article in
Genetics in Medicine argued in favor of a duty to reinterpret VUSs,
supported by the ethical principles of autonomy, beneficence, and
nonmaleficence.198 The authors, a group of medical ethicists and
genetic clinicians, break that duty into four elements: (1) storing the
relevant data; (2) initiating the reinterpretation; (3) reinterpreting
the data; and (4) returning reinterpreted results to the patient.199
They assert that certain aspects of modern genetic testing make it
uniquely suited for an ethical duty to reinterpret, including the
increased ability to identify VUSs using recent genetic innovations,
the amount of currently inconclusive data that will be subject to
reliable future interpretation, and the stability of genetic informa-
tion across a person’s lifespan.200 These facts distinguish genetics
from other kinds of clinical testing, as well as support an ethical
duty to reinterpret.201
According to the authors, ordering and performing genetic tests
triggers an ethical duty to reinterpret the results when more re-
liable information becomes available.202 Both labs and ordering
physicians have a role to play. The authors propose that laboratories
are currently in the best position to (1) store data, (2) know when to
repeatedly cited by courts in different contexts. See, e.g., Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265,
270 (Ohio 1989) (finding that, generally, a specific formula cannot be used to determine
whether one owes a duty of care to another (citing William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52
MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953))); Elabiad v. Trans-W. Express, LLC, No. 3:03CV7452, 2005 WL
1223804, at *4 (N.D. Ohio May 23, 2005).
198. See Appelbaum et al., supra note 106, at 634-35.
199. Id. at 634. The authors of this paper are members of the Ethics Working Group of NIH
Grant 1R01HG010365-01, Development of Recommendations and Policies for Genetic Variant
Reclassification. Id. at 638.
200. Id. at 635.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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reinterpret, and (3) perform the genetic analysis.203 By contrast,
responsibility for the fourth element— returning those results to the
patient—should lie with the ordering physician, who is more likely
than the lab to have direct access to the patient.204 While law and
ethics are certainly distinct, the existence of an ethical duty raises
the question of whether there should be a corresponding legal duty.
Medical associations have also supported imposing duties on labs
and physicians in the wake of a variant reclassification. Two pro-
fessional organizations have already weighed in on this issue: the
American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics (ACMG)205 and
the American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG).206
A 2019 ACMG policy statement considers the post-reclassification
role of physicians. To start, the statement recommends that pro-
viders inform patients taking genetic tests that their results could
change.207 Similar to the ethicists cited above, the ACMG opines
that—even absent a legal duty208—beneficence requires doctors to
at least attempt to recontact patients when the updated results
could affect treatment.209 The ACMG emphasizes the importance of
ensuring that the doctor’s office has the patient’s current contact
information on file.210 Yet, recontacting the patient may not always
be easy. If a patient receives genetic testing from a specialist who
203. Id. at 636.
204. Id.
205. David et al., supra note 65, at 770.
206. See Yvonne Bombard, Kyle B. Brothers, Sara Fitzgerald-Butt, Nanibaa’ A. Garrison,
Leila Jamal, Cynthia A. James, Gail P. Jarvik, Jennifer B. McCormick, Tanya N. Nelson,
Kelly E. Ormond, Heidi L. Rehm, Julie Richer, Emmanuelle Souzeau, Jason L. Vassy,
Jennifer K. Wagner & Howard P. Levy, The Responsibility to Recontact Research Participants
After Reinterpretation of Genetic and Genomic Research Results, 104 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS
578, 581 (2019).
207. David et al., supra note 65, at 770.
208. The statement also notes that, as electronic health records and other technologies
improve, the costs of recontacting will go down, perhaps making courts more open to
recognizing a legal duty to recontact. Id.
209. Id. Older policy documents also support imposing a duty to recontact. See Kurt
Hirschhorn, Lynn D. Fleisher, Lynn Godmilow, R. Rodney Howell, Robert R. Lebel, E.R.B.
McCabe, Matthew J. McGinniss, Aubrey Milunsky, Mary Z. Pelias, Reed E. Pyeritz, Eva
Sujansky, Barry H. Thompson & Randi-Ellen Zinberg, ACMG Policy Statement: Duty to Re-
Contact, 1 GENETICS MED. 171, 171-72 (1999). A 1999 ACMG policy statement asserted that
family doctors are “expected to know the family and ask if new developments in the family
history have occurred and to be alert to new potential opportunities that could affect the
health and future of his/her patients.” Id. at 171.
210. David et al., supra note 65, at 770.
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she sees one time, the scope of the treatment relationship could then
be a single visit.211 While doctors have no legal duty, they may still
have an ethical duty to try to recontact.212
Moreover, a physician may not know when a lab has reclassified
a VUS. Not surprisingly then, the ACMG writes that “[t]he responsi-
bility to inform the ordering physician of variant reclassification or
discovery of a new gene-disease relationship rests with the clinical
laboratory.”213 Thus, like the authors in Genetics in Medicine, the
ACMG supports both imposing ethical duties following a variant
reclassification and dividing those responsibilities between the lab
that performed the test and the doctor who ordered it.214
Around the same time as the ACMG statement, the ASHG issued
similar guidance regarding the responsibility to recontact research
participants.215 Unlike the ACMG, the ASHG gives the subjects of
the test the explicit right to decline the reinterpretation.216 The
recommendations state that the reasons for recontacting patients
are most compelling when (1) a likely pathogenic or pathogenic
variant gets downgraded to a VUS, likely benign, or benign, and
(2) a VUS or likely benign or benign variant is reclassified as likely
pathogenic or pathogenic.217 However, it also explains in no un-
certain terms “that there is no responsibility for researchers to hunt
or scan genetic and genomic data or literature for changes in variant
interpretation.”218 The ASHG states that researchers should only
211. That is not to say no opportunity for liability will exist. See Poirrier v. Richardson, No.
17-864, 2018 WL 1471458, at *7 (E.D. La. Jan. 4, 2018) (imposing the reasonableness stan-
dard on a physician playing a one-time role in a patient’s care and treating that one-time
physician as a possible intervening force in determining whether the patients’ treating
physicians were liable).
212. See Alasdair G.W. Hunter, Neil Sharpe, Michelle Mullen & Wendy S. Meschino,
Ethical, Legal, and Practical Concerns About Recontacting Patients to Inform Them of New
Information: The Case in Medical Genetics, 103 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 265, 267 (2001).
213. See David et al., supra note 65, at 771 n.6.
214. See id.
215. See Bombard et al., supra note 206, at 581. The European Society of Human Genetics
(ESHG) also issued a statement. See Carrieri et al., supra note 11, at 173. The ESHG
recommends that clinicians recontact patients regarding findings with clinical utility. Id. at
179. Recontacting, according to the ESHG, is the shared responsibility of patients and
laboratories. Id. Requests for reanalysis should be initiated by the patient, clinical laboratory,
or the clinician. Id. at 174-75.
216. See Bombard et al., supra note 206, at 584.
217. Id. at 585. 
218. Id.
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recontact participants when there are sufficient resources.219 Under
certain circumstances, such as if a study is without funding, it may
not be appropriate to expect to be recontacted.220
Finally, some labs are adopting a more active role in patient
care.221 Although on an ad hoc basis, those laboratories are already
taking it upon themselves to send updated results to ordering
physicians following reclassification.222 Thus, both professional orga-
nizations and even sometimes labs themselves support informing
patients of a reclassification, even absent an explicit legal duty.
2. Tort Theory
Broadly speaking, tort law allows injured parties to recover
directly from those who harmed them.223 Torts are, then, by their
very nature, redistributive, shifting the costs of an unfortunate
event from the plaintiff to the defendant.224 Yet precisely why—and
sometimes how—the law compensates tort victims remains a topic
of robust philosophical debate. Legal scholars have developed both
economic- and justice-based theories to explain the existence of torts
and to argue for reform.225 Proponents of economic theories believe
that tort law should reallocate costs efficiently, whereas justice
advocates argue for reallocating costs fairly.226 While impossible to
219. Id. at 579.
220. See id. at 583. 
221. See Stevens et al., supra note 19.
222. Id. (citing J.M. O’Daniel et al., A Survey of Current Practices for Genomic Sequencing
Test Interpretation and Reporting Processes in US Laboratories, 19 GENETICS MED. 575, 580
(2017); Daniele Carrieri, et al., Recontact in Clinical Practice: A Survey of Clinical Genetics
Services in the United Kingdom, 18 GENETICS MED. 876, 877 (2016)).
223. See Jules Coleman, Scott Hershovitz & Gabriel Mendlow, Theories of the Common
Law of Torts, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/tort-theories/ [https://perma.cc/W5B8-7CCM].
224. Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1653, 1656 (1998).
225. See generally Coleman et al., supra note 223 (providing a broad overview of tort
theory).
226. See id. In recent years, some tort theorists have rejected the notion that tort law
functions to achieve certain external goals—whether those goals be economic efficiency or
moral justice—and have instead argued for an internal theory of tort law. See Cristina
Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE L.J. 1320, 1324 (2017); see also Michael L.
Rustad, Twenty-First-Century Tort Theories: The Internalist/Externalist Debate, 88 IND. L.J.
419, 423 (2013) (gathering distinguished macrolevel theorists to evaluate the claims of civil
182 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:143
offer a complete account here, we consider briefly how each of the
major tort theories would support imposing legal duties related to
variant reclassification.
Economic theories of tort law seek to minimize costs by creating
incentives to avoid harms in the first place.227 According to this line
of thinking—absent legal liability—people may impose unreason-
able risks of injury on one another.228 For example, the owner of an
amusement park may be tempted to skimp on expensive ride repairs
if she does not bear any of the costs of her patrons’ injuries.
However, making her legally liable when parkgoers get hurt creates
a financial incentive to ensure a certain baseline of safety. Thus, the
tort system can encourage socially beneficial behavior—usually tak-
ing precautions to prevent injuries—with the threat of liability.229
Under an economic approach, a liability framework is only defensi-
ble when its benefits outweigh the costs that it imposes.230
In the context of variant reclassification, patients are currently
bearing a substantial number of costs. They are, after all, the people
who suffer—and sometimes die—when laboratories and physicians
fail to share updated genetic information.231 Without uniform
practices surrounding reclassification, reinterpretation, and re-
contacting, patients are left to shoulder much of this burden alone.
Under the current system, laboratories and doctors share reinter-
preted results on an ad hoc basis.232 While norms surrounding
professional ethics and best practices may be developing for both
labs and physicians, patients remain vulnerable absent the means
for legal recovery.233 Establishing legal duties for both laboratories
and physicians could shift these costs away from patients to the
parties who are better equipped to bear them.
recourse from external perspectives in an authors-meet-critics format). While important, these
insights go beyond the scope of this Article.
227. Coleman et al., supra note 223.
228. See id.
229. See Steven Shavell, A Fundamental Enforcement Cost Advantage of the Negligence
Rule over Regulation, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 275, 287-88 (2013).
230. See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product
Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (2010) (concluding that the costs of products liability may
not be worth the benefits).
231. See, e.g., Williams v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 3d 432, 437 (D.S.C. 2018).
232. Bombard et al., supra note 206, at 579.
233. See EAST ET AL., supra note 65, at 11.
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Absent insurance coverage, labs and doctors will be responsible
for bearing these costs. The cost of reinterpreting and recontacting
is not confined to the patients who will actually get sick. Should
courts opt to impose legal duties related to variant reclassification,
laboratories and ordering physicians will have to make updated
information available to all potentially impacted patients, not just
those who develop symptoms. Of course, the laboratories and
physicians could attempt to lower these costs by prioritizing re-
classifications of VUSs as pathogenic or likely pathogenic. But even
that will require labs to monitor all VUSs. And as the story of the
family whose members underwent unnecessary surgeries demon-
strates, notifying patients that a variant has been reclassified as
benign or a VUS can also be important.234
Simultaneously, the costs of reinterpretation and recontacting are
likely decreasing. Computational and communication technologies
are streamlining the process of genetic analysis and enabling
greater communication between patients, laboratories, and phy-
sicians.235 As the burdens associated with updating patients
continue to go down, the current distribution of the costs associated
with variant reclassification could become increasingly harmful and
inefficient. We discuss how to properly allocate the proposed legal
duties associated with variant reclassification in Section B below.
Justice-based accounts look not to economic efficiency but rather
to fairness.236 Unsurprisingly, torts scholars have not arrived at a
singular, unified theory of which outcomes are just and why. Civil
recourse theory argues that tort law empowers individuals who
have been wrongly injured to seek redress against the people who
harmed them.237 Similarly, corrective justice creates an obligation
on the part of the tortfeasor to repair the wrong that she has
caused.238 Retributive theories take a somewhat related but
different approach. They view tort law not as a mechanism to allow
234. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
235. See Deignan et al., supra note 57, at 1267; Kathryn E. Flynn, Maureen A. Smith &
Margaret K. Davis, From Physician to Consumer: The Effectiveness of Strategies to Manage
Health Care Utilization, 59 MED. CARE RSCH. & REV. 455, 467-68 (2002).
236. See Coleman et al., supra note 223.
237. See Richard A. Posner, Instrumental and Noninstrumental Theories of Tort Law, 88
IND. L.J. 469, 470 (2013).
238. See Coleman et al., supra note 223.
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plaintiffs to recover from socially unjustifiable wrongs, but as a tool
to punish blameworthy defendants.239 Finally, distributive justice
seeks to ensure that all members of society share the benefits and
burdens of risky activity fairly.240 Distributive justice differs from
corrective justice. Corrective justice assumes that the initial
distribution of resources is just and that tort law functions to simply
restore that previous balance.241 By this account, corrective justice
is merely transactional.242 It does not consider whether the result of
that transaction is, in and of itself, fair.243 By contrast, distributive
justice considers the fairness of the initial resource distribution, as
well as the reallocation post-tort.244 Under each of the justice-based
models, tort law seeks to reinforce important social norms related
to fairness.
Justice-based theories of tort law also generally endorse imposing
legal duties related to variant reclassification. As noted, ethicists
and clinicians have recently argued to impose duties on both labora-
tories and physicians based on a variety of bioethical principles.245
Concerns related to preserving patient autonomy, promoting patient
well-being, and preventing harm all likewise speak to justice.246
Thus, they reason that the nature of modern genetic testing creates
a moral imperative to reinterpret results following a reclassification
and to share that information with the patient.247
When the labs and the physicians fail to take this ethically
appropriate action and the patient suffers a harm as a result,
justice-based tort theories would support imposing liability. Under
civil recourse, the patient has the right to recover; and, pursuant to
corrective justice, the laboratories and the doctors are obliged to
239. See Scott Hershovitz, Torts as a Substitute for Revenge, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUN-
DATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 86, 87 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014).
240. See Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of
Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 194-96 (2000).
241. See Hanoch Sheinman, Tort Law and Distributive Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUN-
DATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 239, at 354, 374; Coleman et al., supra note 223.
242. Coleman et al., supra note 223.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., Appelbaum et al., supra note 106, at 638.
246. Id. at 634-35.
247. Id. at 638.
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rectify the harms that they generate.248 Lastly, from a distributive
justice perspective, the laboratories and the physicians often have
greater knowledge and resources.249 Patients may then be unable to
benefit from clinically actionable variant reclassifications without
help from those parties.250 Patients also must bear the physical,
psychological, and financial burdens of any resulting health con-
ditions. Distributive justice theories of tort might then advocate
shifting some of the ex ante responsibilities to the labs and doctors,
as well as allowing patients to recover ex post for the failure to give
them clinically actionable information.
Retributive theories of tort, which seek to punish wrongdoers, are
perhaps the most uncomfortable fit here, as certain factors mitigate
the blameworthiness of the potential defendants. First, the basis of
the proposed torts would be the failure to do something—mainly
reinterpret results and recontact patients—rather than affirmative
acts.251 Second, laboratories and physicians provide socially valuable
health care services. A tort framework based on punishment is,
thus, not desirable given that the moral culpability of the labs and
the doctors is less than clear. Of course, retributive justice often
plays an important part in correcting situations in which individual
harms are difficult to identify yet a public harm needs addressing.252
Arguably, a failure to reinterpret and to recontact may lead to wide-
spread dissatisfaction and loss of confidence in the medical
system.253 However, labs and physicians are not, at least in most
cases, blameworthy bad actors deserving of punishment.254
248. See Coleman et al., supra note 223.
249. See Serena Olsaretti, Introduction: The Idea of Distributive Justice to THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 6, 7 (Serena Olsaretti ed., 2018).
250. See Lily Hoffman-Andrews, The Known Unknown: The Challenges of Genetic Variants
of Uncertain Significance in Clinical Practice, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 648, 653 (2017).
251. See, e.g., supra Introduction.
252. As opposed to corrective justice, in which bilateral private litigation can right the
victim’s wrong, including her feelings of indignation. See Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr.,
The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi: Auto Accidents and General Deterrence, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 239, 268-69 (1967) ("In large part corrective justice is concerned ... with satisfying the
victim’s feeling of indignation. If the victim [cannot sue], he will not get the satisfaction of
seeing his wrong righted.”).
253. Recall, for example, the results of the survey indicating patients lost trust in their
doctor as a result of VUS reinterpretation. See Makhnoon et al., supra note 78, at 192.
254. See generally Ronen Perry, The Role of Retributive Justice in the Common Law of
Torts: A Descriptive Theory, 73 TENN. L. REV. 177 (2006).
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Summing up, both economic- and justice-based theories of tort
law may support imposing legal duties related to variant reclassifi-
cation.
3. Tort Doctrines
Lastly, courts have themselves developed tests for assessing when
it is appropriate to impose a previously unrecognized legal duty.
Most law students are familiar with the infamous California
Supreme Court case Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia.255 In that case, the court held that mental health care
providers have a duty to warn third parties of the potential dangers
posed by their patients.256 Quoting William Prosser, who stated that
tort duties are “the sum total of [policy] considerations ... which lead
the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to pro-
tection,”257 the court looked to a variety of factors, including the
foreseeability of harm, the certainty of the injury, the connection
between the defendant’s actions and the plaintiff’s injury, the moral
blameworthiness of the defendant, the desire to prevent future
harm, the costs to the community of imposing a duty, and the
availability and affordability of insurance.258
The Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted a similar framework
in Snyder v. American Association of Blood Banks.259 Again, the
court began with the proposition that “the existence of a [legal] duty
ultimately is a question of fairness and policy.”260 It then went on to
explain that the foreseeability of injury, the nature of the risk, the
parties’ relationship, and the effect liability would have on the
public were all relevant considerations.261
Some—but not all—of the Tarasoff and Snyder factors support
imposing duties related to variant reclassifications. Certainly, in the
case of clinically actionable information, the risk of harm to the
255. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
256. Id. at 351.
257. Id. at 342 (quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 332-33 (3d ed. 1964)).
258. Id. at 358 (citing Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968)). 
259. 676 A.2d 1036 (N.J. 1996).
260. Id. at 1048.
261. Id.
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patient is foreseeable.262 The failure to update denies the patient the
opportunity to take potentially life-saving actions.263 Additionally,
there is a desire to prevent negative health outcomes, and the costs
of avoiding those harms are growing increasingly low.264 Less clear,
however, are the certainty of the injury—since not every patient will
manifest the condition associated with a genetic risk265—and the
moral culpability of the labs and the physicians.266 Tarasoff and
Snyder, thus, provide some support for recognizing genetic duties.
Yet, deciding that courts should recognize these genetic duties does
not answer the question of who should bear them. We address this
issue in the following Section.
B. Allocating Genetic Duties
Judge Guido Calabresi introduced one of the most popular
economic accounts of tort law in his path-breaking 1970 book, The
Costs of Accidents.267 He advocates placing legal liability on the
party who can most readily avoid the potential harms.268 That party
is the “cheapest or [least] cost avoider” because she can avert the
harm with the fewest accompanying costs.269 In other words, she is
best situated to prevent the injury in the first place.
Calabresi presented his theory as a cleaner alternative to the
fault-based tort system. Instead of engaging in potentially costly
and time-consuming negligence analysis, he and Jon Hirschoff
propose making the cheapest cost avoiders strictly liable for the
torts that they could have prevented.270 While we do not advocate a
262. See Brawn v. Oral Surgery Assocs., 819 A.2d 1014, 1028 (Me. 2011) (recognizing that
a special relationship existed with a former patient and that “[o]nce a safety alert is received
‘it can hardly be argued that any harm to a patient is not foreseeble.’” (quoting Harris v.
Raymond, 715 N.E.2d 388, 394 (Ind. 1999))).
263. See supra Introduction.
264. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
265. See Ingrid Lobo, Same Genetic Mutation, Different Genetic Disease Phenotype, NATURE
EDUC.: SCITABLE (2008), https://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/same-genetic-mutation-
different-genetic-disease-phenotype-938/ [https://perma.cc/RLA7-TBAH].
266. See supra Part II.A.2.
267. GUIDO CALABRESI,THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS:ALEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
268. Id. at 135. 
269. Id. at 135 n.1.
270. Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972). 
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strict liability approach here, we nonetheless use the “cheapest cost
avoider” epithet as shorthand for assessing the relative costs and
benefits shouldered by the parties.271
Before considering how to best allocate these potential legal
duties, it is worth noting that the dynamics of the treatment rela-
tionship are changing.272 A patient may see a variety of providers in
the course of her treatment.273 For example, a family doctor who
suspects that a patient has cancer may refer the patient to an
oncologist. The oncologist could then order a genetic test but send
the patient to a geneticist for additional testing and follow-up. Thus,
one patient could see a team of doctors related to a single health
issue.274
Additionally, the role of the patient herself is also changing.
Medical care is moving toward a more cooperative model. Physicians
are no longer the gatekeepers of health information that they once
were.275 Patients can access their test results directly from labs276
and their medical records online.277 There have also been efforts to
give patients greater control over medical decision-making.278 Also,
as noted, some labs are reaching out to patients to share updated
results directly.279 Thus, any legal duties related to variant reclassi-
fication should take into account the increasingly cooperative—and
often complex—nature of the modern treatment relationship.
While a number of different parties could be involved in a
patient’s care, and thus, possibly implicated in a lawsuit, we focus
271. Although we do not explicitly consider a strict liability approach here, we do not
disavow its potential applications in this context. 
272. See generally R. Kaba & P. Sooriakumaran, The Evolution of the Doctor-Patient
Relationship, 5 INT’L J. SURGERY 57 (2007).
273. See, e.g., Who Will Be Involved in My Treatment?, WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/a-
to-z-guides/treatment-team#1 [https://perma.cc/FTF8-C32L].
274. See id.
275. See Flynn et al., supra note 235, at 455-56. See generally Jessica Mantel, A Defense
of Physicians’ Gatekeeping Role: Balancing Patients’ Needs with Society’s Interests, 42 PEPP.
L. REV. 633 (2015).
276. See HHS Strengthens Patients’ Right to Access Lab Test Results, DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/clia/index.html
[https://perma.cc/WFS5-5APT].
277. See Increasing Patient Access to Medical Records, UIC: HEALTH INFORMATICS,
https://healthinformatics.uic.edu/blog/increasing-patient-access-to-medical-records/
[https://perma.cc/97FR-PLEN].
278. Kaba & Sooriakumaran, supra note 272, at 59.
279. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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here on three primary stakeholders: (1) the lab conducting the
original analysis, (2) the treating physician ordering the genetic
test, and (3) the patient seeking care.280 In the following three
Subsections, we discuss each of these stakeholders in turn.
1. Laboratories
Following a reclassification, laboratories could do a few different
things.281 They could simply inform ordering physicians of the re-
classification. (From there, the ordering physicians could either
request reinterpretation or contact patients.) Alternatively, labs
could reinterpret the results and share the updated information
with the ordering physicians, who could then contact patients with
the new results. Finally, labs could both reinterpret the genetic
data and recontact patients directly.
As explained in Part I, laboratories decide how to classify the
variants that they interpret, and no uniform standards or processes
govern when reclassification occurs.282 Because they do the re-
classifying—as well as the analyzing—laboratories are in the best
position to know when reinterpretation would be appropriate. Not
all reclassifications are equally relevant to a patient’s health.283 For
example, a VUS that is reclassified to likely benign may not be
worth the costs of reinterpreting. Consequently, the labs are the
cheapest cost avoiders when it comes to reinterpretation. But what
should they do with that information? Merely share it with the
ordering physicians? Or should the labs attempt to reach out to the
patients themselves?
Certainly, having the labs share reinterpreted results directly
with patients saves the patients time and money. Yet, while lab-
oratories are uniquely well-situated to know when to reinterpret,
they may not be well-equipped to actually provide that information
280. Depending on the facts of each case, other parties—particularly other parties with
direct patient contact or those whose actions had a direct impact on a medical decision—might
be open to suit. See Foulkes et al., supra note 20, at 170. But here, we only consider the two
parties with the most prominent role in generating and interpreting genetic data: clinical
genetics laboratories and the physician ordering and interpreting the genetic tests.
281. These scenarios were developed in conversation with our colleagues on the grant.
282. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
283. See Deignan et al., supra note 57, at 1268.
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to patients. To be sure, patients can now obtain their test results
directly from labs.284 However, the laboratories themselves may not
have ready access to patients or to their contact information.285
Instead, labs communicate primarily with ordering physicians.
Although labs are the clear cheapest cost avoiders with respect to
reinterpretation, they may not be the cheapest cost avoiders when
it comes to actually recontacting the affected patients.
2. Physicians
Unlike laboratories, doctors are not well-equipped to know when
reinterpretation is appropriate. Most clinicians are not geneticists.
As a general matter, doctors tend to be poorly situated to manage,
interpret, and advise patients regarding their genetic test results
beyond what is in the lab report.286 Consequently, physicians may
not even know when a reclassification occurs, let alone when to ask
labs to reinterpret their individual patients’ results. 
Doctors may, however, have direct contact with patients in a way
that labs often do not. In particular, the physician who ordered the
original genetic test is well-positioned to bear some of the duties
associated with sharing updated results post-reclassification. The
ordering physician has had contact with the patient and possesses
some basic knowledge of the genetic factors at play and their
potential consequences. After all, if the doctor did not have a sense
of the patient’s health condition—and a belief that a genetic test
could reveal potentially valuable information—she never would
have ordered it in the first place. 
As a result, although ordering physicians are not the cheapest
cost avoiders when it comes to reinterpretation, they are the
cheapest cost avoiders (1) for knowing when it is appropriate to
share the updated information with the patient (that is, when the
284. See HHS Strengthens Patients’ Rights to Access Lab Test Results, supra note 276.
285. See Hoffman-Andrews, supra note 250, at 652; cf. Colin Mitchell, Corrette Ploem,
Valesca Retèl, Sjef Gevers & Raoul Hennekam, Experts Reflecting on the Duty to Recontact
Patients and Research Participants; Why Professionals Should Take the Lead in Developing
Guidelines, 63 EUR. J. MED. GENETICS 103642, 103642 (2020) (“Clinical lab specialists
regarded it as currently unfeasible to systematically update records and recontact patients.”).
286. See Wendy S. Rubinstein, Roles and Responsibilities of a Medical Geneticist, 7
FAMILIAL CANCER 5, 13 (2007).
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updated results communicate clinically actionable health informa-
tion) and (2) for actually contacting the patient with that update.287
Depending on the situation, the ordering physician might not want
to give the patient the updated results immediately. The doctor
might instead decide to have a conversation with the patient about
the reclassification and to ask the patient whether she would like
her reinterpreted results. Allowing the patient to decide if she wants
new information better respects the recent shift toward cooperative
medicine.288
While patients may see multiple providers over the course of their
treatment, we focus here on the ordering physician. Of course,
sometimes the ordering physician will not have the most frequent
contact with the patient. For example, a family doctor will often
have more regular interactions with a patient than an oncologist or
a geneticist. However, the lab will have the readiest access to the
ordering physician. Thus, although not ideal in every circumstance,
we believe that placing the duty to recontact on the ordering phy-
sician is the most appropriate allocation of this duty.289
3. Patients
Of the three relevant kinds of stakeholders, patients are in the
weakest position to bear the costs associated with variant reclassifi-
cation. To start, patients are unlikely to know when labs reclassify
variants, let alone when reinterpretation would be appropriate.
Most patients lack medical training and genetic expertise. Perhaps
287. See supra notes 267-80 and accompanying text.
288. See generally Miguel Cabarrus, David M. Naeger, Alexander Rybkin & Aliya Qayyum,
Patients Prefer Results from the Ordering Provider and Access to Their Radiology Reports, 12
J. AM. COLL. RADIOLOGY 556, 556-61 (2015) (discussing the benefits of cooperative medicine
in the context of radiologist-patient interactions).
289. Of the doctors who have encountered the patient, the ordering physician would also
be the most likely to know what to do with the lab’s updated report. This is important
because, almost uniformly, the available literature points to the fact that physicians are
typically not well equipped to manage, interpret, and advise patients as to genetic test results.
See Ellen Wright Clayton, Susanne Haga, Patricia Kuszler, Emily Bane, Krysta Shutske &
Wylie Burke, Managing Incidental Genomic Findings: Legal Obligations of Clinicians, 15
GENETICS MED. 624, 626 (2013); Stevens et al., supra note 19; Matthew Joseph Westbrook,
Comment, Transforming the Physician’s Standard of Care in the Context of Whole Genome
Sequencing Technologies: Finding Guidance in Best Practice Standards, 9 ST. LOUIS U. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 111, 148 (2015).
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due to the lack of genetic counseling, research shows that patients
often misunderstand their genetic test results.290 If they have diffi-
culty processing their original results, grasping that those results
may change over time—despite their genetic information remaining
the same—may only add to the confusion. Patients are usually not
familiar with the scientific literature and, as a result, will not know
when it is appropriate to ask a lab to reinterpret their previous
results.
Furthermore, making patients primarily responsible for reinter-
pretation could potentially deepen health disparities.291 Fully
appreciating the meaning of a reclassification may be challenging
even for educated people whose first language is English.292
Consider that seventy-seven million people—about a third of all
U.S. adults—have “difficulty with common health tasks, [like]
following directions on a prescription drug label.”293 Certain popu-
lations tend to have lower health literacy.294 Not surprisingly then,
the ACMG has cautioned against putting too much responsibility on
patients or their families for a variety of reasons, including lack of
medical knowledge, cultural or language barriers, difficulty reading,
or unfamiliarity with the health care system.295
290. More precisely, physicians may be misunderstanding genetic test results or, in the
alternative, the way physicians are communicating these results to the patients results in
confusion. See, e.g., Dennis Thompson, Misunderstood Gene Tests May Lead to Unnecessary
Mastectomies, HEALTHDAY (Apr. 12, 2017), https://consumer.healthday.com/cancer-infor-
mation-5/breast-cancer-news-94/misunderstood-gene-tests-may-lead-to-unnecessary-
mastectomies-721596.html [https://perma.cc/UR9A-K9P2] (discussing Stephen J. Katz et al.,
Gaps in Integrating Genetic Testing into Management of Breast Cancer, 35 J. CLINICAL
ONCOLOGY 160 (2017) (addressing the challenges in communicating genetic results to
patients)).
291. See Making Health Care Work Better for Vulnerable Patients, COMMONWEALTH FUND
(Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2018/making-health-care-work-
better-vulnerable-patients [https://perma.cc/B7Q5-Y3VH] (“We also know health care is often
inconvenient or inaccessible to low-income patients, who may lack paid time off work or
transportation to visit the doctor, leading many to rely on the emergency department.”).
292. America’s Health Literacy: Why We Need Accessible Health Information, U.S.DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.: OFFICE OF DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, https://web.
archive.org/web/20190730172815/health.gov/communication/literacy/issuebrief/
[https://perma.cc/S96P-ZRNG].
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. See David et al., supra note 65, at 770.
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In addition to these structural challenges, recall that reclassifi-
cation may disproportionately impact people with non-European
descent.296 People of color—who are more likely to have non-
European ancestry—already experience significant health dispari-
ties.297 The populations who are more likely to benefit from variant
reinterpretation are also less likely to have access to the very
health care that would allow them to take clinical action. Charging
patients with seeking their own reinterpretation could just pile on
to those existing burdens.
Patients are, however, in the best position to know how their
doctors can get in touch with them. The ACMG recommends that
providers who order genetic tests advise patients prior to testing
that their results could change and that it is, therefore, important
to maintain current contact information.298 Thus, as courts decide
the contours of the legal duties associated with variant reclassifica-
tion, it may be appropriate to hold patients accountable for provid-
ing up-to-date contact information. However, as we describe in the
following Part, that expectation should be clearly communicated to
patients when they undergo genetic testing. Expecting patients to
keep their contact information up to date may sometimes be un-
reasonable.
* * * 
Recall from Part I that no legal duty currently requires labs or
physicians to ensure that patients have access to updated test
results following a variant reclassification.299 Regardless, medical
ethicists and professional organizations have spoken out in favor of
ethical responsibilities to reinterpret and to recontact.300 Addition-
ally, both tort theory and doctrine offer support for imposing cer-
tain genetic duties.301 However, clinical laboratories may not have
access to patients’ current contact information, and many ordering
296. Slavin et al., supra note 58, at 1059-60.
297. See Wayne J. Riley, Health Disparities: Gaps in Access, Quality and Affordability of
Medical Care, 123 TRANSACTIONS AM. CLINICAL & CLIMATOLOGICAL ASS’N 167, 168-70 (2012).
298. David et al., supra note 65, at 770-71.
299. See supra Part I.B.1.
300. See supra Part II.A.1.
301. See supra Parts II.A.2-3.
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physicians are not geneticists and will not be aware when a
reclassification occurs.302 We thereby conclude that courts should
place the duty to reinterpret on the laboratory that ran the test and
the duty to recontact on the physician who ordered it. This alloca-
tion imposes the legal burden on the parties best situated to bear
the costs for each of the respective duties.
III. BREACHING GENETIC DUTIES
In the preceding Part, we argue in favor of imposing certain
genetic duties and consider how to efficiently allocate those re-
sponsibilities. In this Part, we take a deeper dive using case studies
to consider when defendants might breach the legal duties to
reinterpret and to recontact. 
As a preliminary matter, we note that what might be reasonable
conduct related to current and future patients may differ from what
constitutes reasonable conduct for past patients. Going forward, we
suggest proactive measures like informing patients that reclassi-
fications are possible and charging them with maintaining up-to-
date contact information to facilitate recontacting. We also propose
that technology such as email could help ease the potential burdens
associated with updating patients after a variant reclassification.
After discussing what can be done going forward, we then turn to
past patients. We consider what would constitute reasonable
conduct for five potential categories of defendants: (1) boutique
labs, (2) high-volume labs, (3) clinical geneticists, (4) oncologists,
and (5) family doctors. For our plaintiff, we return to the hypotheti-
cal from the Introduction: a thirty-seven-year-old woman with a
family medical history of cancer, who was not informed that her
variant gained clinical significance.303
Pursuant to the Learned Hand test, courts must consider the
nature and the likelihood of the plaintiff’s injury.304 Thus, the
clinical significance of the variant reclassification might be impor-
tant.305 Not all reclassifications communicate clinically actionable
302. See David et al., supra note 65, at 770-71.
303. See supra Introduction.
304. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
305. Deignan et al., supra note 57, at 1269 (suggesting labs should prioritize reclassi-
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risks. For example, a lab could reclassify a VUS of the BRCA1 gene
to likely benign. But when a reclassification is clinically action-
able—particularly if the reclassification is to likely pathogenic or
pathogenic—the potential benefit of updating the plaintiff is high.
Had the patient in the hypothetical known that the lab reclassified
her VUS as pathogenic, she could have taken steps that might have
saved her life. For purposes of our analysis, the probability and
severity of her resulting injury remain constant for all types of
defendants.
For simplicity’s sake, we assume that the potential lawsuits are
timely and that no other procedural bars arise. We also focus ex-
clusively on breach and do not consider issues related to injury or
causation, such as proximate cause or foreseeability. We first dis-
cuss proposals and considerations for current and future patients.
We then consider legal duties that might apply to former patients.
A. Going Forward
As noted in Part I, variant reclassifications are likely to become
increasingly commonplace as genetic science continues to ad-
vance.306 In deciding how to address the potential ethical and legal
issues associated with variant reclassification, laboratories and
physicians should not sit and wait for patients to sue them. Instead,
labs and doctors should proactively adopt policies (1) to inform
patients at the front end that variant reclassification may occur, and
(2) to outline their procedures for ensuring that patients have access
to the reinterpreted results. These processes could shift some of the
responsibility onto the patients themselves. It is our hope that, as
technology improves, the task of sharing reinterpreted results with
patients will grow increasingly easier.
fications with potential clinical implications); see also Bombard et al., supra note 206, at 586-
87 (recommending reclassifying when there is clinical utility). The ESHG recommends that
clinicians recontact patients regarding findings with clinical utility. See Carrieri et al., supra
note 11, at 178.
306. See supra Part I.A.1.
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1. Proactive Measures
Both labs and physicians could adapt existing infrastructures to
apply to variant reclassification. For example, most laboratories
have terms of service.307 If something goes wrong, the terms of
service will often govern the dispute.308 Laboratories should, there-
fore, consider introducing language into their terms of service that
discuss variant reclassification. For example, a term could explain
that genetic test results may change over time and that the
laboratory will inform either the ordering physician or the patient
of any such updates by email. Although research shows that many
people fail to actually read the terms of service, labs could adopt
policies—such as requiring patients to sign a document or click a
box—to encourage patients to review the provisions.309 Likewise,
physicians get their patients’ consent prior to medical procedures.310
Disclosing that both variant reclassification may occur and that the
doctor may recontact the patient as a result could, therefore, become
part of the informed consent process.311 Thus, laboratories and
doctors could use the current mechanisms that define their relation-
ships with patients to outline the potential rights and obligations
associated with variant reclassification.
Despite recommending that both labs and physicians take posi-
tive action related to variant reclassification, we acknowledge that
efficiency may favor putting primary responsibility on the labora-
tory. First, recall that the nature of medicine is changing.312 While
perhaps not yet the norm, patients have increasing amounts of
307. See, e.g., Terms & Conditions, AMBRY GENETICS (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.
ambrygen.com/legal/terms-and-conditions [https://perma.cc/P4D2-WNTP] (“These terms and
conditions govern your rights and responsibilities with regard to [the services].”).
308. See id.
309. See Shankar Vedantam, Do You Read Terms of Service Contracts? Not Many Do,
Research Shows, NPR:HIDDEN BRAIN (Aug. 23, 2016, 5:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/08/
23/491024846/do-you-read-terms-of-service-contracts-not-many-do-research-shows [https://
perma.cc/VY9R-GKUE].
310. Mark A. Hall, David Orentlicher, Mary Anne Bobinski, Nicholas Bagley & I. Glenn
Cohen, Informed Consent, in HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 152, 153 (9th ed. 2018).
311. The ACMG recommends that providers inform patients that their results could be
updated and advise them to provide up-to-date contact information. David et al., supra note
65, at 770-71.
312. See supra notes 272-79 and accompanying text.
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direct contact with labs.313 Second, the laboratory is in the best
position to know when reinterpretation is appropriate because it
both conducted the original test and subsequently reclassified the
variant.314 Finally, having the lab contact the patient directly avoids
burdening the ordering physician and streamlines the process,
reducing the chance of a communication breakdown.315 Although
some labs may already have patient contact information on file for
billing purposes,316 they are often not the cheapest cost avoiders
with respect to reaching patients.317 Thus, this approach will not
work for older cases because the labs will likely not have patients’
contact information on hand. It does, however, present a potentially
viable option for variant reclassification in the future.
As labs and physicians adopt policies and practices for updating
patients following a variant reclassification, patients could them-
selves bear some of that responsibility. As explained in Part II,
individual patients are often the cheapest cost avoiders with respect
to how to best contact them.318 Laboratories and physicians would,
therefore, be wise to tell patients that they must keep their contact
information current. In fact, the ACMG goes as far to say that
physicians should advise the patient or the family that “[i]t is the
patient’s obligation to provide updated contact information over
time” as part of the informed consent process.319 Of course, expecting
patients to regularly update their contact information could be
unreasonable under certain circumstances, such as a single visit to
a geneticist. While charging patients with providing current contact
information could sometimes be too costly, it is likely efficient in
many cases. Making patients responsible for maintaining up-to-date
contact information could save valuable time and resources, as labs
and physicians will expend less effort tracking down elusive
patients.
313. See supra notes 272-79 and accompanying text.
314. See supra Part I.A.1.
315. See David et al., supra note 65, at 770-71.
316. See, e.g., Test Requisition Form, COLOR GENOMICS (July 2018), https://static.getcolor.
com/pdfs/Color_Hereditary_Cancer_Test_Requisition_Form_Self_Pay.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5RCG-KFF6] (providing “email address” form).
317. See supra Part II.B.1.
318. See supra Part II.B.3.
319. David et al., supra note 65, at 771.
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2. Technological Ease
Technology could reduce the potential burdens of reinterpreting
and recontacting.320 Technology lowers the costs of communi-
cation.321 In the consumer genetics space, companies like
AncestryDNA and 23andMe may email users changes to their
policies and updates of their results.322 Recently, AncestryDNA
refined how it determines users’ genetic ancestry—a reclassifica-
tion of sorts—and informed its customers electronically.323 Similarly,
the FDA emails consumers regarding recalls, market withdrawals,
and safety alerts.324 Laboratories or physicians could thus share
updated results using email or health care apps. In fact, some
providers are already using these tools to contact patients.325 Some
studies show that patients may actually prefer to contact their
doctors using email and websites.326
320. Providers once considered reinterpretation and recontacting desirable but unfeasible.
See Jennifer L. Fitzpatrick, Cecil Hahn, Teresa Costa & Marlene J. Huggins, The Duty to
Recontact: Attitudes of Genetic Service Providers, 64 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 852, 852 (1999).
Advances in technology may be a key factor in changing that. See Corrette Ploem, Colin
Mitchell, Wim van Harten & Sjef Gevers, A Duty to Recontact in the Context of Genetics:
Futuristic or Realistic?, 25 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 537, 553 (2018) (“Developments in health
information technology ... will reduce the burden of updating previous test results and
communicating new information, including to former patients.”); Rothstein, supra note 150,
at 289 (“Electronic health records and technology that enables the simultaneous contacting
of all patients with certain medical conditions make such warnings feasible.”).
321. See Ploem et al., supra note 320, at 553.
322. See, e.g., Privacy Highlights, 23ANDME (Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.23andme.com/
about/privacy/ [https://perma.cc/3Z5Y-5SGH] (“By creating a 23andMe account, you are
agreeing that we may send you product and promotional emails or notifications about our
Services.”).
323. See Ancestry Team, Ancestry Surpasses 15 Million DNA Customers, ANCESTRYDNA
(May 31, 2019), https://blogs.ancestry.com/ancestry/2019/05/31/ancestry-surpasses-15-million-
dna-customers/ [https://perma.cc/LNP6-U5Z7].
324. See Recalls, Market Withdrawals, & Safety Alerts, FDA (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.
fda.gov/safety/recalls-market-withdrawals-safety-alerts [https://perma.cc/HX5B-KCU9]. Other
government agencies provide similar services to notify consumers of product recalls. Join
Agency Recall Subscription Lists, RECALLS.GOV, https://www.recalls.gov/list.html [https://
perma.cc/K23N-BY33].
325. See Ken Abrams, Steve Burrill & Natasha Elsner, What Can Health Systems Do to
Encourage Physicians to Embrace Virtual Care?, DELOITTE: INSIGHTS (July 18, 2008),
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/health-care/virtual-health-care-health-
consumer-and-physician-surveys.html [https://perma.cc/Y7XB-ZZH8].
326. Joy L. Lee, Niteesh K. Choudhry, Albert W. Wu, Olga S. Matlin, Troyen A. Brennan
& William H. Shrank, Patient Use of Email, Facebook, and Physician Websites to
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It is, of course, worth noting that not all patients have ready
access to the internet. While most Americans own smartphones,327
many people still cannot afford high-speed internet, particularly in
rural areas.328 Additionally, the elderly—although less likely to take
genetic tests—might also hesitate to use cell phones or other tech-
nologies.329 Thus, certain people may not be reachable by email or
other technology.
Even assuming full technological access, many patients may be
unable to understand the updated results without the help of a phy-
sician or a genetic counselor. Remember that about a third of all
U.S. adults have difficulty with common health tasks, like following
prescription drug label instructions.330 Language and reading bar-
riers could further exacerbate this problem. Populations with lower
levels of literacy or who do not speak English could, therefore, lose
the opportunity to benefit from their updated results. Yet, there are
also technological solutions here, such as software to read emails
aloud and services like Google Translate.331 However, people will
need access to those technologies to benefit from them.
In sum, laboratories and physicians should begin developing
policies related to variant reclassification proactively. Technology
may be able to provide the necessary infrastructure for keeping
patients informed cheaply and easily. Yet, as labs and doctors adopt
Communicate with Physicians: A National Online Survey of Retail Pharmacy Users, 31 J.GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 45, 45 (2016); see Jason Shafrin, Physician-Patient Email Communication: A
Review, HEALTHCARE ECONOMIST (Aug. 2, 2006), https://www.healthcare-economist.com/2006/
08/02/physician-patient-email-communication-a-review/ [https://perma.cc/8A5M-L64W]
(“Among individuals with Internet access, 90% want to communicate with their physician over
email.”).
327. Eighty-one percent of Americans own smartphones. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH.
CTR.: INTERNET TECH. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/
mobile [https://perma.cc/T3U6-FGV6]; see also Leah R. Fowler & Stephanie R. Morain,
Shrödinger’s App, 46 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 203-04 (2020) (laying out the relevant statistics).
328. See ANNL.CUPP CURLEY, POPULATION-BASED NURSING:CONCEPTS AND COMPETENCIES
FOR ADVANCED PRACTICE 142 (3d ed. 2020); Mobile Fact Sheet, supra note 327.
329. CURLEY, supra note 328, at 142.
330. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RSCH.&QUALITY: CONSUMER ASSESSMENT OF HEALTHCARE
PROVIDERS & SYS. (CAHPS), Doc. No. 911, CAHPS ADULT HOSPITAL SURVEY: ABOUT THE
CAHPS HEALTH LITERACY ITEM SET FOR HOSPITALS 2, https://www.ahrq.gov/sites/default/
files/wysiwyg/cahps/surveys-guidance/hospital/about/about-the-health-literacy-item-set-for-
hospitals-911.pdf [https://perma.cc/82QF-QRK5].
331. See, e.g., Google Translate, GOOGLE, https://translate.google.com/ [https://perma.cc/
K9ZV-MXTU] (translating text or audio from one language to another in real time).
200 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:143
processes for reinterpreting and recontacting, they should remain
aware of the potential access barriers that could arise for certain
patients. Moreover, building infrastructures—even with the benefit
of technology—takes time and effort. Labs and physicians may try
one approach to informing patients, only to necessarily revise it and
try something new. Courts should, therefore, be sympathetic to
these issues when deciding whether a breach has occurred.
Having established a framework for dealing with genetic duties
to current and future patients, we now turn to the duties to reinter-
pret variants and recontact former patients.
B. Duty to Reinterpret
We argue that, following variant reclassifications, clinical labo-
ratories have a duty to notify the physicians who originally ordered
the tests, as well as to provide them with the updated results.
Although this analysis may seem relatively straightforward, labs
vary tremendously with respect to the volume of tests that they
process, the kinds of testing that they offer, and their relationships
with the ordering physicians.332 Thus, whether the lab has breached
its duty to reinterpret would be a highly fact-intensive inquiry.
Labs come in all sizes. One lab might handle approximately one
thousand tests each year, while another processes one hundred forty
thousand.333 The size of the lab could impact the costs associated
with giving patients access to updated results following a variant
reclassification because the more tests that a lab handles the
greater the number of patients that a reclassification could impact.
Furthermore, larger laboratories may process samples and send
results across jurisdictions with different legal rules. Thus, a lab
may be subject to medical malpractice law in one state and ordinary
negligence in a neighboring state.334 Such inconsistencies may
mean, for example, that a lab could violate one state’s law in an
332. See Brian J. Linehan, Mohamed M. El-Nageh, Stephen Cordner & Alan Richter, Ethics
in Laboratory Medicine, in CLINICAL LABORATORY MEDICINE 134, 135 (Kenneth D. McClatchey
ed., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter Ethics in Laboratory Medicine]; supra Part I.A.1.
333. Telephone Interview with Wendy K. Chung, Kennedy Fam. Professor of Pediatrics in
Med., Med. Dir. of the Columbia Genetic Counseling Graduate Program, Columbia Univ.
Vagelos Coll. of Physicians and Surgeons (Aug. 26, 2019).
334. See, e.g., supra Part I.B.1.
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effort to comply with another’s. Of course, larger labs may have
access to greater resources, which could help them offset some of
those costs.
Recall too that labs offer different kinds of services—and combi-
nations of services—including single-gene tests, panels of single-
gene tests, whole exome sequencing, and whole genome sequenc-
ing.335 The amount of patient data that a laboratory handles will
also affect its potential legal duties following reclassification. In
particular, labs that do full exome and genome sequencing deal with
many more genes than labs that focus on single-gene tests.336 More
genes mean more opportunities for reclassification and, by conse-
quence, reinterpretation. Thus, those labs could face greater legal
responsibilities.
Lastly, laboratories have varying levels of contact with the physi-
cians who order the genetic tests.337 In some circumstances—like
certain academic settings—a given lab might work regularly with
a handful of providers. By contrast, large reference laboratories may
have more arms-length dealings with the ordering physicians.338
Bearing the legal burdens associated with reclassification may be
easier for labs that have ongoing relationships with repeat players.
Courts should take these variations into account when hearing
cases related to variant reclassification. To illustrate how some of
these issues may play out, we consider two case studies: (1) a
boutique lab that offers cancer-focused testing and handles a
relatively small number of patients from the same set of ordering
physicians, and (2) a lab that offers a wide variety of tests at a very
high volume with no ongoing relationship with the providers who
order the tests.339 Of course, not all labs will fall neatly into these
335. See generally Tina M. Hambuch, John Mayfield, Shankar Ajay, Michelle Hogue, Carri-
Lyn Mead & Erica Ramos, Clinical Genome Sequencing, in CLINICAL GENOMICS, supra note
41, at 21, 21-22, 24-25 (discussing different sequencing techniques used in a clinical
laboratory).
336. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
337. See Ethics in Laboratory Medicine, supra note 332, at 134-35.
338. Cf. Julie R. Taylor, Pamela J. Thompson, Jonathan R. Genzen, John Hickner &
Marisa B. Marquez, Opportunities to Enhance Laboratory Professionals’ Role on the
Diagnostic Team, 48 LABMED. 97, 100 (2017) (analyzing how the different provider-laboratory
relationships affect communication between the two).
339. The scenarios were developed in conversation with Wendy K. Chung, Kennedy Fam.
Professor of Pediatrics in Med., Med. Dir. of the Columbia Genetic Counseling Graduate
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categories. Some boutique labs may handle a high volume of
patients, and some laboratories that provide a variety of tests may
regularly service the same physicians’ patients. Thus, these case
studies are simply examples and do not represent all labs.
Practically speaking, the first question the court must decide is
whether the laboratory is a health care provider for purposes of
medical malpractice. However, as noted in Part I, the primary
differences between medical malpractice and ordinary negligence
would likely be procedural, such as the special statutes of limi-
tations and statutes of repose that govern medical malpractice
claims.340
1. Boutique Lab
Although courts will likely apply some variation of a reasonable-
ness standard either way, we can pause for a moment to consider
whether the boutique lab is a health care provider for medical
malpractice purposes. The fact that the lab offers medical services
to diagnose and treat patients could be sufficient in most states.341
When the ordering physician is closely affiliated with the lab—say
when she is an employee of the same institution, uses the same lab
routinely to order testing, or has some supervisory authority over
the lab—courts have been more likely to find that the lab is subject
to malpractice laws.342 Therefore, our boutique lab would probably
be the patient’s fiduciary.
Program, Columbia Univ. Vagelos Coll. of Physicians and Surgeons.
340. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
341. Determining that a lab is a health care provider and therefore subject to malpractice
laws is, to all intents and purposes, a determination that a professional relationship exists,
and that questions involving medical judgment are involved. See Foulkes et al., supra note
20, at 165. The facts of the Williams case illustrate this well, as the patient was treated with
medication that exacerbated his condition because a lab reported a certain genetic variant to
his doctor as a VUS, rather than as pathogenic. See Williams v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 353
F. Supp. 3d 432, 436-37 (D.S.C. 2018). Had the report been different, the doctor would have
selected a different course of treatment. See id.
342. See, e.g., Annunziata v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 8 N.Y.S.3d 168, 169 (N.Y. App. Div.
2015) (finding “laboratory services ... performed at the direction of a physician are an integral
part of the process of rendering medical treatment”); Baskette v. Atlanta Ctr. for Reprod.
Med., LLC, 648 S.E.2d 100, 101 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (finding the laboratory’s tasks were “tasks
... under the supervision of physicians”).
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With regard to the applicable standard of care, the lack of
uniformity in lab practices surrounding both reclassification and
reinterpretation makes it extremely difficult—if not impossible—to
apply a professional custom standard.343 Yet as more laboratories
adopt the recommendations of the ethicists and professional orga-
nizations described in Part II, customs and norms may develop.
More likely than not, reasonableness will carry the day in many
jurisdictions.344
Courts will probably apply a reasonableness standard regardless
of whether the cause of action is for medical malpractice, ordinary
negligence, or the breach of a professional duty to reinterpret.345
According to the Learned Hand test, whether the laboratory
breached would depend in part on the costs of reinterpretation.346
Our facts tell us the boutique lab has limited resources and handles
a small number of patients, often from the same set of providers.
Courts might find that the relatively low number of patients—plus
the lab’s relationship with the ordering physicians—make the bene-
fits outweigh the costs. Moreover, because it specializes in cancer-
related tests, the staff of the boutique lab should have been well
aware of the potential significance of the reclassification. The court
may, therefore, find it was unreasonable to fail to reinterpret our
hypothetical patient’s results.
2. High-Volume Lab
The case might come out somewhat differently for the high-
volume lab. Again, the court will first decide whether the lab is a
health care provider for purposes of medical malpractice. Unlike the
boutique lab, the high-volume lab does not have a close relationship
343. See Caitlin Chisholm, Hussein Daoud, Mahdi Ghani, Gabrielle Mettler, Jean
McGowan-Jordan, Liz Sinclair-Bourque, Amanda Smith & Olga Jarinova, Reinterpretation
of Sequence Variants: One Diagnostic Laboratory’s Experience, and the Need for Standard
Guidelines, 20 GENETICS MED. 365, 366 (2018); see also Collins v. Itoh, 503 P.2d 36, 41 (Mont.
1972) (“The custom and practice of one particular [health care provider], without knowledge
of the general custom and practice among the profession, cannot establish a reasonable basis
to infer that defendant departed from that practice.”).
344. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
345. See supra Part I.B.1.
346. See Deignan et al., supra note 57, at 1268-69; supra notes 164-65 and accompanying
text.
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with the ordering physicians. The ordering physicians will, however,
likely use the results in the course of medical treatment. That fact
alone may be enough for courts in some jurisdictions to find that the
high-volume lab is a health care provider.347 Again, reasonableness
will likely be the standard that the court applies.
As noted above, what constitutes a breach will depend to some
extent on the burden that reinterpretation poses. Here, the costs
may outweigh the benefits. The high-volume lab handles a larger
number of patients, as well as a broad variety of providers in
different practice areas. The providers are, thus, less likely to be
repeat players in a meaningful way. While the same physicians may
use the lab over and over, the lab is handling so many tests that a
more intimate working relationship will not develop. Moreover, the
high-volume lab is, by nature, less specialized than the boutique lab.
Handling a wide variety of tests might make it harder for the high-
volume lab to know if a reclassification is clinically actionable for a
particular patient. Given the large number of providers and the
diversity of tests, a court might hold that it was reasonable for the
high-volume lab to simply email ordering physicians updated
results without any additional information or follow-up.
Moreover, the amount of data and kinds of testing handled by
the high-volume lab raise additional concerns. Recall that some labs
run virtual panels, as described in Part I. They generate data on
hundreds—even thousands—of genes that they will not even
analyze, let alone report back to the patient.348 Say, for example,
that the high-volume laboratory offers a wide range of services that
include tests related to both the BRCA1 and SCN1A genes. The
doctor ordered a cancer panel for our hypothetical patient, which
includes the BRCA1—but not the SCN1A—gene.349 Suppose that the
high-volume lab has rapid sequencing technology. For ease of
operation, it sequences all of its patients’ genetic data. If the lab
reclassifies a BRCA1 VUS, it should inform the ordering physician,
as outlined above. However, if the lab reclassifies a SCN1A VUS, it
may have no obligation to do so. It would not be reasonable for the
347. See generally Foulkes et al., supra note 20, at 160-65 (detailing the factors courts look
to in determining when labs might be classified as health care providers).
348. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
349. See supra Part 1.A.2 (discussing BRCA1 and SCNIA).
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patient to expect updated information about a gene unrelated to the
testing that her physician ordered, regardless of whether the lab
had sequenced her data for that gene.
Although beyond the scope of our hypothetical patient’s case, full
sequencing, whether of the entire genome or just the exome, raises
somewhat different concerns. In those circumstances, patients tend
to be on diagnostic odysseys.350 Physicians try to provide answers by
looking at large amounts of genetic data.351 Thus, the classifica-
tion—or reclassification for that matter—of any single variant is
unlikely to matter. Unless, of course, the reclassified variant turns
out to be the needle in the proverbial haystack. A lab that reclassi-
fies a BRCA1 variant may need to provide a physician who ordered
a cancer panel with updated results. However, the lab would have
no obligation to inform that physician of the reclassification of a
SCN1A variant. Yet, in the case of full genome sequencing, the lab
may need to inform physicians whenever it reclassifies any variant.
While labs may have a duty to reinterpret results following a
variant reclassification, what constitutes a breach of that duty will
depend on a variety of factors, including the type of lab and the test
that was originally ordered.
C. Duty to Recontact
While ordering physicians may not know when a reclassification
occurs, they are best situated when it comes to recontacting patients
to share updated results. Hence, after a lab sends the reinterpreted
results, the physician may then have an obligation to share that
updated information with the patient.352 Yet whether recontacting 
350. “The ‘diagnostic odyssey’ is what we call that meandering, lengthy, and frustrating
quest for a diagnosis. Genetic counselors, medical geneticists, and patients ... are achingly
familiar with it. The allusion to Homer’s Odyssey is apt.” BARBARA B. BIESECKER, KATHRYN
F. PETERS & ROBERT RESTA, ADVANCED GENETIC COUNSELING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 197
(2019).
351. See id.
352. Authors writing about the Canadian legal system came to a similar conclusion. Adrian
Thorogood, Alexander Bernier, Ma’n Zawati & Bartha Maria Knoppers, A Legal Duty of
Genetic Recontact in Canada, 40 HEALTH L. CAN. 58 (2019) (manuscript at 24) (the duty to
recontact is only appropriate when “updated genetic information from which clear clinical
significance can be inferred is readily made available to physicians”).
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is appropriate depends in part on the doctor’s judgment regarding
the clinical value of sharing those new results, in light of the
patient’s entire medical record.353 Thus, the individual physician’s
understanding of the reclassification may affect whether she has
breached her duty to update the patient.
Courts will not demand that doctors search to the ends of the
earth for their patients. They usually require only a reasonable
effort.354 Reasonable efforts to contact patients may include phone
calls, follow-up care, certified letters, and even reaching out to
family.355 Physicians should maintain evidence that they made
reasonable efforts.356
The status of the treatment relationship could affect findings of
breach. When actively seeing a patient, a physician should be able
to recontact her following a reclassification without too much
effort.357 However, as explained in Part II, sometimes a physician
will see a patient for only a single visit. Traditionally, when there
is no active treatment relationship, there are no accompanying legal
duties.358 That said, even absent a clear treatment relationship, the
ACMG recommends that physicians should still make a reasonable
effort to recontact the patient.359 It is, therefore, possible that a
court may find that the reinterpretation itself could trigger the
physician’s duty to recontact the patient.
353. See Deignan et al., supra note 57, at 1269; Bombard et al., supra note 206, at 584; see
also Est. of Abuaf v. Saint Barnabas Med. Ctr., No. A-3468-14T4, 2017 WL 371473, at *2 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 25, 2017) (“‘The law recognizes that medicine is not an exact
science,’ and that ‘good [medical] treatment will not necessarily prevent a poor result.’”
(quoting Schueler v. Strelinger, 204 A.2d 577, 584 (N.J. 1964)) (alteration in original));
Nestorowich v. Ricotta, 767 N.E.2d 125, 131 (N.Y. 2002) (Smith, J., dissenting) (“As the
majority states, the error in judgment charge should be given only where there are two or
more possible courses of action and a doctor chooses one.”).
354. Courts will at least expect physicians to try. See, e.g., Cox v. Paul, 828 N.E.2d 907, 913
(Ind. 2005) (holding that a cursory search of patient records and no further effort was not
enough). 
355. See Tanuz v. Carlberg, 921 P.2d 309, 314 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996). In Cox v. Paul, the
Indiana Supreme Court held that a health care provider who has notice of possible dangerous
side effects of treatment might be held liable for failure to make reasonable efforts to advise
or warn patients of such dangers. 828 N.E.2d at 913-14.
356. See Chi Yun Ho v. Frye, 880 N.E.2d 1192, 1201 (Ind. 2008) (requiring evidence, not
speculation, to establish reasonable efforts).
357. David et al., supra note 65, at 770.
358. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
359. David et al., supra note 65, at 770-71.
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Again, we employ case studies to illustrate how courts might
calculate breach. We return to our hypothetical BRCA1 patient and
consider three different ordering physicians: (1) a clinical geneticist,
(2) an oncologist,360 and (3) a family doctor. Because the doctors are
health care providers, we apply medical malpractice law.
1. Clinical Geneticist
Imagine that, in the course of our patient’s annual checkup in
2010, her family doctor notices the high rates of breast and ovarian
cancers in the patient’s family medical history. The family doctor
refers her to a clinical geneticist who works in a large medical
complex. During the patient’s appointment, the geneticist decides
to order a BRCA1 test, which comes back with a VUS. The patient
and the geneticist meet one final time to go over the results. The
geneticist tells the patient that her test results do not indicate
hereditary breast/ovarian cancer syndrome. Both parties anticipate
no further contact. The treatment relationship therefore ends in
2010. In 2015, the geneticist receives a call from the laboratory
informing her that the lab has reclassified the patient’s VUS as
pathogenic.361 While courts hearing traditional medical malpractice
claims are unlikely to hold physicians liable five years after the
treatment relationship ends,362 the call from the laboratory could be
sufficient to trigger a duty to recontact.363
360. Not all specialists are comparably situated. An oncologist could have a better working
knowledge of genetics than, for example, a cardiologist who orders a test to diagnose hyper-
trophic cardiomyopathy. See generally Michael J. Hall & Olufunmilayo I. Olopade, Disparities
in Genetic Testing: Thinking Outside the BRCA Box, 24 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2197 (2006)
(discussing the prevalence of genetics in cancer care).
361. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
362. Mark Rothstein and Gil Siegal have proposed using the Medicare billing rule as a
guideline, which “deems a patient who has been seen within the past three years as
‘established,’ whereas a patient who has not been seen within the past three years would be
considered ‘new’ if he or she made a return visit to that physician.” Mark A. Rothstein & Gil
Siegal, Health Information Technology and Physicians’ Duty to Notify Patients of New Medical
Developments, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 93, 131 (2012).
363. See Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 595 (M.D.N.C.), aff’d sub nom. Stuart v.
Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014) (“States have also long required health care providers
to give patients information they need to make informed decisions about medical treatment.”);
cf. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[T]he physician is under an
obligation to communicate specific information to the patient when the exigencies of reason-
able care call for it. Due care may require a physician perceiving symptoms of bodily
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The Learned Hand analysis may require courts to consider the
relative resources of the defendant in deciding whether there has
been a breach.364 In fact, one primary criticism of imposing a legal
duty to recontact patients has been that some physicians lack the
resources to meet this potential legal burden.365 Because the genet-
icist works in a large, resource-rich setting, a court might expect her
to make more of an effort to recontact the patient than the rural
family doctor described below.366 Yet as noted in Part I, it could be
more challenging for a clinical geneticist—who may encounter
thousands of patients but for only a small number of visits each—to
track the affected patients down following a reclassification.367 Thus,
in certain cases it may be too costly to find a particular patient.
That said, as physicians gain greater access to computing and
communications technologies, those innovations can ease the
potential financial and administrative burdens, making recontact-
ing more reasonable.368 And we might expect a doctor in a state-of-
the-art medical center to have access to these technological tools
sooner.
2. Oncologist
Now suppose that instead of referring the patient to a geneticist,
the patient’s family doctor finds a lump in the patient’s breast.
Following a biopsy that detects a premalignant lesion, the doctor
refers the patient to an oncologist. The oncologist diagnoses the
patient with stage 0 breast cancer and suggests a lumpectomy. The
oncologist also orders the BRCA1 test based on the patient’s family
medical history.369 Following the procedure, the oncologist declares
abnormality to alert the patient to the condition.”).
364. See supra Part I.B.2.
365. See Martin Letendre & Béatrice Godard, Expanding the Physician’s Duty of Care: A
Duty to Recontact?, 23 MED. & L. 531, 537 (2004); Thomas L. Hafemeister & Selina Spinos,
Lean on Me: A Physician’s Fiduciary Duty to Disclose an Emergent Medical Risk to the Patient,
86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1167, 1178 (2009).
366. See infra Part III.C.3.
367. See supra Part I.B.2.
368. See Rothstein & Siegal, supra note 362, at 103 (“The development and continuous
progress of the computing and communication sciences and new applications provide a wide
range of relevant tools to achieve this end.”).
369. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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the patient cancer-free and tells her that—given her genetic test
results—she faces only a very low risk that the cancer will recur.
Two years later, the laboratory contacts the oncologist to inform her
that the lab has reclassified the patient’s VUS as pathogenic.370
Although it is unlikely that the doctor saw the patient very much
since declaring her cancer-free, the relationship between a cancer
patient and her oncologist often continues.371 Courts have concluded
that doctors with less frequent contact with their patients owe them
fiduciary duties.372 Moreover, as noted above, new clinically ac-
tionable information could reinvigorate a dormant treatment
relationship.
Of course, determining that the oncologist owed her patient a
duty is not enough. Courts must determine whether she breached
that duty.373 Returning to the Learned Hand analysis, the benefits
to the patient might outweigh the potential costs of recontacting.374
To be sure, oncologists are not necessarily experts in genetics.375 If
the oncologist fails to appreciate the clinical value of the reclassifi-
cation, a court may not find that she breached her duty to recontact
the patient.376 However, oncologists regularly use genetic tests to
inform their treatment decisions, especially when it comes to
BRCA1.377 Moreover, unlike the geneticist, the oncologist’s obliga-
tions to the patient include follow-up care.378 Thus, the court in our
370. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
371. See Follow-Up Medical Care, NAT’L CANCER INST., https://www.cancer.gov/about-
cancer/coping/survivorship/follow-up-care [https://perma.cc/U9U9-S3VL] (“All cancer survivors
should have follow-up care.”).
372. See Cox v. Paul, 828 N.E.2d 907, 913-14 (Ind. 2005) (concluding that an oral surgeon
owed his patient a duty to make reasonable efforts to contact the patient).
373. See supra Part I.B.2.
374. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
375. See Richard L. Haspel & Jeffrey E. Saffitz, Genomic Oncology Education: An Urgent
Need, A New Approach, 20 CANCER J. 91, 93-94 (2014).
376. In Gardner v. McDonald, an oncologist did not breach his duty by failing to
communicate the results of bone scans and a radiologist’s recommendation that there be a
follow-up because the oncologist did not view the scans as conclusive proof of metastatic
cancer. 660 So. 2d 107, 109, 111-12 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
377. See Hall & Olopade, supra note 360, at 2197.
378. In this context, a patient may expect follow-up care as part of treatment. However,
principles of medical malpractice govern the analysis above. One can also conceptualize the
failure to update as a breach of informed consent principles. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464
F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing the doctrine of informed consent and the physician’s
duty to disclose). In that case, the patient’s expectations become important, as opposed to the
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hypothetical case could find that, as compared to the geneticist, the
oncologist must make more of an effort to recontact the patient
based on the nature and expectations of the treatment relationship.
3. Family Doctor
For the last hypothetical case study, imagine that the patient’s
family doctor orders the test herself after reviewing the patient’s
family medical history. Suppose that the physician has a solo
practice in a rural area and treats the majority of the community
members there. The doctor sees the patient for routine checkups, as
well as for minor illnesses and injuries. When the laboratory calls
regarding the reclassification, the patient is already planning to
come in for her annual physical.
Here, the question of a treatment relationship is relatively
straightforward. Keeping patients informed of their medical risks
is part of a family doctor’s job. As with the preceding case studies,
courts will likely focus on the question of reasonableness.379 Among
our three doctors, the family doctor is least likely to understand the
clinical relevance of the variant reclassification. Thus, a court might
hold her to a lower standard than the geneticist or the oncologist,
who are more likely to appreciate the importance of the update. At
a minimum, the court would expect the hypothetical patient’s doctor
to review her records in light of the variant reclassification.380
Resources might be particularly relevant to the reasonableness
analysis in this case. What is reasonable for a rural family doctor
will be different from what is reasonable for a specialist working in
a large medical center, who has both ample resources and a nar-
rower patient pool.381 Courts may not want to overwhelm providers
who are already working with limited resources. Thus, courts may
require less for the rural family doctor to fulfill her obligations to
the patient. That said, the nature of the family doctor’s practice may
reasonableness of the doctor’s actions. See Rothstein & Siegal, supra note 362, at 123 (finding
that some jurisdictions use the reasonable patient standard in the informed consent context).
379. See supra Part I.B.1.
380. See supra Part II.B.2.
381. See supra Part I.B.2.
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make it easier for her to get in touch with the patient than for either
the geneticist or oncologist.
* * * 
Failing to inform patients when labs reclassify a VUS could deny
them access to clinically actionable information. However, doctors
may not know when reclassification occurs, and labs may lack direct
access to patients.382 We therefore propose that courts place the duty
to reinterpret on the lab and the duty to recontact on the ordering
physician. While not a perfect solution, we believe that allocating
the legal responsibilities in this way plays to the strengths of both
kinds of potential defendants. However, the facts of the individual
case will inevitably affect whether a given defendant has breached
those duties.383 Thus, as in all kinds of tort cases, what is reason-
able for one class of defendants may not be reasonable for other
kinds of defendants.
CONCLUSION
Fully realizing the potential for genetic medicine requires giving
patients access to up-to-date risk information. As we develop better
knowledge of the genome and faster techniques for analysis, the
need for genetic duties will only increase. In this Article, we argue
that reclassifying a VUS should trigger legal duties on the part of
the clinical laboratory and the ordering physician and propose a
framework for liability.384 Thankfully, advances in science and tech-
nology will also address many of the practical challenges to
updating patients by making the processes of reclassification,
reinterpretation, and recontacting more streamlined. Yet in the
meantime, laboratories and doctors should begin developing policies
to address these issues.
Importantly, our proposal is by no means a guarantee of liability
for labs and doctors. As discussed in Part III, deciding if a breach
occurred can be very fact intensive. For example, for the boutique
382. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
383. See supra Part I.B.2.
384. See supra Parts II.B, III.
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lab—which does targeted testing for a small group of providers—the
duty to reinterpret might require the lab to share updated results
with each affected ordering physician and to ensure that the pro-
vider actually receives that information in an understandable
form.385 By contrast, the high-volume lab might only need to send a
single email.386 Thus, what might constitute a breach of the duty to
reinterpret for the boutique lab might not be a breach for the high-
volume lab. Similar questions arise in the context of the physicians’
duty to recontact. How many times must the doctor reach out to the
patient to share the updated results? If the patient has died, should
the physician attempt to locate her family members? And what may
constitute a reasonable effort to recontact on the part of the rural
family doctor may well be a breach for the clinical geneticist, or vice
versa.387 Further, while outside the scope of this Article, the plaintiff
must also establish that the breach caused a legally cognizable
injury.388
Establishing genetic duties is therefore only the beginning.
Courts dealing with torts cases related to variant reclassification
will undoubtedly have to grapple with these and many other issues.
Although important legal questions certainly remain, creating
clearly recognized genetic duties—and placing them on the parties
best situated to bear those responsibilities—is a vital first step to
ensuring access to the most accurate genetic information currently
available.
385. See supra Part III.B.1.
386. See supra Part III.B.2.
387. See supra Part III.C.
388. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
